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ARTICLE
POWERS, RIGHTS, AND SECTION 25
Ann Woolhandler*
The 1789 Judiciary Act's Section 251 has proved an embarrass-
ment for those claiming that all federal question jurisdiction must
vest, either originally or by appellate review, in the federal courts.2
© 2011 Ann Woolhandler. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* William Minor Lile Professor of Law and Joseph C. Carter, Jr., Research
Professor, University of Virginia. My thanks to Michael Collins, Barry Cushman,
George Rutherglen, John Harrison, Caleb Nelson, and Steve Walt for comments.
I Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 83, 85-87.
2 See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 263 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, Neo-Federalist]
(arguing that all federal question jurisdiction had to vest either originally or by appel-
late review in the federal courts); Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499,1529-30 (1990) [hereinafter Amar, Two-
Tiered] (same). For other proponents of mandatory vesting see, for example, Steven
G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the
Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1002,
1013-14, 1032-33, 1036, 1047 (2007), arguing for mandatory vesting using an objec-
tive-meaning textualist perspective, and adding that the Supreme Court must have
review of federal question cases decided both by inferior federal courts and state
courts; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implemen-
tation of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1515, 1618
(1986), arguing for mandatory vesting of both diversity and federal question jurisdic-
tion; David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial Branch,
1999 BYU L. REv. 75, 100-04, arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause limits
congressional power over federal jurisdiction; RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case!
Controversy Distinction and the Dual Function of Federal Courts, 69 NoR E DAm L. REV.
447, 494-96 (1994), providing a version of Amar's two-tiered thesis, arguing that Con-
gress must give jurisdiction, inter alia, over all federal question cases where its princi-
pal function is exposition of federal law; and Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power
over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157, 201 (1960),
arguing that the Supreme Court must be available to address persistent conflicts
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Because Congress did not provide for general federal question juris-
diction in the lower federal courts until 1875, 3 Supreme Court review
of state court judgments under Section 25 would be needed to ensure
that all cases arising under federal law would vest in some Article III
court. On its face, however, Section 25, as well as its 1867 successor, 4
excluded some federal issues from Supreme Court review of state
court judgments, particularly when the state court overvindicated a
federal claim. 5 Indeed, review at the instance of either side of federal
issues was not clearly available until Congress amended the review
provisions in 1914.6 This amendment responded to the apparent
unreviewability of the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Ives v.
South Buffalo Railway Co., 7 holding that the state's workers' compensa-
tion law was unconstitutional.8
A leading modern proponent of mandatory vesting, Akhil Amar,
sought to blunt the impact of Section 25 on his mandatory vesting
claim by two arguments-one specific to Section 25 and the other
more general as to the role of federal question jurisdiction. As to Sec-
tion 25 specifically, Amar reasoned that the direct review provisions in
fact did encompass all federal questions, because Section 25's text
could be read to include either side's claim under federal law.9 He
argued that "[i] n virtually every case in which one party argues for a
federal 'right,' the other side can argue that it has a federal 'immu-
nity'-which is simply another way of saying that one's opponent has
no federal right."'10
At a higher level of generality, Amar harkened to a more general
theme in much federal courts scholarship-that the primary role of
the federal courts is the protection of individuals against govern-
ment." This theme was somewhat in tension with Amar's theory that
between state and federal law or in the interpretation of federal law by the lower
federal courts.
3 SeeAct of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470. The 1875 Act required
over $500 in controversy. Id. § 2, 18 Stat. at 470.
4 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
5 See id. § 2, 14 Stat. at 386-87; Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. at 85-87.
6 See Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790.
7 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
8 See id. at 448.
9 See Amar, Two-Tiered, supra note 2, at 1530.
10 Id.; see also Ratner, supra note 2, at 185-86 (arguing that the proper scope of
the review provisions logically would have supported review of state legislation that
the state courts held unconstitutional, but that such review was not required as part of
the Court's essential functions).
11 See Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note 2, at 263. Although I have brought up this
argument second, Amar made this argument earlier. See also David E. Engdahl, Fed-
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all federal question jurisdiction necessarily vested in the federal courts
and that Section 25 encompassed review no matter which way the fed-
eral issue had been decided. 12 But for Amar, even if Section 25 were
more restrictive than he claimed, that section nevertheless had vested
the most important part of mandatory federal question jurisdiction by
providing review for all undervindications of federal rights. 13 The
point of Article III's mandatory vesting of federal question jurisdic-
tion, after all, was not uniformity but federal rights enforcement:
The inspiration behind "arising under" jurisdiction was rooted not
in uniformity but in the importance of protecting individual rights
by providing an impartial and independent national tribunal.
Where the state court decision violated no individual federal rights,
but in fact gave the litigant raising a federal right more than he was
entitled to as an absolute minimum, no compelling need for federal
court supervision would arise. 14
Other scholars who argue for some form of mandatory vesting, partic-
ularly those arguing against broad congressional power to strip fed-
eral courts of jurisdiction, similarly emphasize federal courts' central
role in protecting constitutional rights. 15 (For some mandatory vest-
ing proponents, however, uniformity is also an important concern. 16 )
eral Question Jurisdiction Under the 1789Judiciary Act, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 521,
522-26 (1989) (arguing that given a narrower view of what arose under federal law,
Congress had vested review of virtually all federal question jurisdiction in the First
Judiciary Act); Engdahl, supra note 2, at 136-37 (same).
12 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
1569, 1588 (1990) (noting the possible conflict between Amar's arguments).
13 SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 83, 85-87.
14 See Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note 2, at 263 (footnote omitted); see also Amar,
Two-Tiered, supra note 2, at 152 (indicating that uniformity is not required by the
structural principles underlying Article III).
15 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress'Author-
ity to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 44, 67 (1981)
[hereinafter Sager, Foreword] (indicating that effective federal judicial review must be
available for claims of constitutional rights); see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Mea-
sure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1213,
1221 (1978) [hereinafter Sager, Fair Measure] (arguing that other branches of govern-
ment should be given leeway to enforce underenforced constitutional norms-fed-
eral rights that the courts might limit due to concerns for, e.g., federalism); cf
Clinton, supra note 2, at 1541-42 (stating that the Framers' concern was not to assure
uniformity but rather the supremacy of federal law, which was sufficiently vindicated
by the 1789 Judiciary Act).
16 See Pushaw, supra note 2, at 496, 499 (stating that the federal courts' crucial
function in "cases" was the exposition of federal law); id. at 499 (emphasizing both
the necessity of uniformity and supremacy for federal question cases); Ratner, supra
note 2, at 161, 166-68 (emphasizing uniformity and supremacy).
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Daniel Meltzer disagreed with Amar's mandatory vesting thesis,
and argued that history did not support Amar's claim that Section 25
granted the Supreme Court power to take review at the instance of
either side of a federal rights claim.17 He noted that one could not
always easily turn a claim of overenforcement of a federal right into an
immunity or privilege. 18 He acknowledged that reasoning like Amar's
surfaced in a 1908 case and a few subsequent decisions involving
employees' actions against railroads. 19 But these late decisions did
not overcome a number of decisions from 1806 to 1902, in which the
Court read Section 25 and its 1867 successor as only giving review for
federal rights denials. 20 Edward Hartnett has since reinforced Melt-
zer's arguments that historically review was not equally available to
both sides.21 Hartnett's argument was not primarily addressed to the
mandatory vesting issue, but rather in service of his argument that the
Court should rarely grant review in cases such as Michigan v. Long,22 in
which state prosecutors claim that the state courts have overvindicated
criminal defendants' constitutional rights. 23
17 See Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1588.
18 Id. at 1588-89 (giving an example where a libel plaintiff who claims the state
court should not have treated him as a public figure would not be seen as claiming a
federal immunity or privilege); see also Edward Hartnett, Why Is the Supreme Court of the
United States Protecting State Judges from Popular Democracy?, 75 TEX. L. REV. 907, 919
(1997) (providing additional support for Meltzer's argument).
19 See Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1589-90; see also Ratner, supra note 2, at 185
(relying primarily on Ill. Cent. R.R. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. 514 (1906), as well as the
railroad liability cases beginning in 1908 to show that the Court had "apparently
accept[ed] the full implications" of the review provisions). But cf. Meltzer, supra note
12, at 1589 n.68 (criticizing Ratner's reliance on several cases).
20 See Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1589-90, 1590 n.73 (citing FELIX FRANKFURTER &
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 190 n.20 (1927) (listing the
sixteen cases)).
21 See Hartnett, supra note 18, at 915-22 (arguing that Section 25 in fact was a
substantial limit).
22 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (indicating that the state court's ambiguous reliance on
state as well as federal grounds would be treated as a reviewable decision in the con-
text of a state's seeking review of a Fourth Amendment decision in the defendant's
favor).
23 See id. at 1040-42; Hartnett, supra note 18, at 914 & n.46. While disagreeing
with Amar as to mandatory vesting, Hartnett effectively agreed with Amar as to direct
review's preeminent function being to address denials of federal tights. Cf id. at
915-22. Others have critiqued the Court's taking review in cases of state overvindica-
tion of federal rights. See, e.g., Richard A. Seid, Schizoid Federalism, Supreme Court Power
and Inadequate Adequate State Ground Theory: Michigan v. Long, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV.
1, 69 (1984) (concluding that the Court should not review state court decisions where
no constitutional right was denied and the decision may rest on a state law ground,
and that one can infer congressional approval of the Court's traditional reluctance to
[VOL. 86:31244
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Critics have also taken on the argument advanced by Amar and
others that that the primary role of federal question jurisdiction-and
federal courts more generally-is the protection of individual rights
(even while Amar argued for review of all claims). Paul Bator had
previously criticized the view that individual- constitutional rights pro-
tection was the only constitutional value, claiming that structural val-
ues such as federalism should be similarly appreciated. 24 And in the
context of Supreme Court review of state court judgments, Thomas
Baker defended cases such as Long, where the Court took review to
address state court overenforcement of federal individual rights pro-
tections.25 Such critiques were compatible with trends beyond federal
review cases such as Long); Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Relationship
Between State and Federal Courts: A Critique of Michigan v. Long, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1118, 1121 (1984) (criticizing Longfor, inter alia, minimizing the importance of state
courts as protectors of individual rights); cf Sager, Fair Measure, supra note 15, at
1248-50 (suggesting the Court grant certiorari less in cases where state courts are
alleged to have overenforced federal constitutional norms). See generally RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 516 (6th ed. 2009) (collecting authorities).
24 See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 605, 607 (1981) (noting the rhetorical tradition in federal courts schol-
arship that federal courts are the guardians of individual rights against the states); id.
at 631 (criticizing assumptions that "the Constitution contains only one or two sorts of
values: typically, those which protect the individual from the power of the state, and
those which assure the superiority of federal to state lawi). Carlos Vdzquez has sug-
gested that providing an inhospitable forum for certain types of claims may be an
appropriate aim of federal question jurisdiction. See Carlos M. Vdzquez, The Federal
"Claim" in the District Courts: Osborn, Verlinden, and Protective Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 1731, 1733, 1746 (2007) (stating that in Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480 (1983), "Congress conferred jurisdiction to provide a less hospitable
forum for those raising claims against foreign states," and concluding that this is a
"valid reason to confer jurisdiction over federally-created claims").
25 See Thomas E. Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in
Criminal Cases: Federalism Along a Mobius Strip, 19 GA. L. REv. 799, 828-29 (1985) (argu-
ing that the Long approach advances the federal structure by requiring state courts to
make their own decisions under state law); id. at 858 (suggesting that the " [f] ederal
interests in error correction, coherence of doctrine, and uniformity" support federal
court review of state overenforcement of federal constitutional rights); cf. Martin H.
Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court "Federal"Decisions: A Study in Interactive Feder-
alism, 19 GA. L. REv. 861, 865 (1985) (favoring more Supreme Court review of state
court decisions that may have been influenced by federal law, in order to promote
interactive federalism); David A. Schlueter, Federalism and Supreme Court Review of
Expansive State Court Decisions: A Response to Unfortunate Impressions, 11 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 523, 548-49 (1984) (concluding that Long embodies a sensible approach to
ambiguous state law grounds). See generally PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.,
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 100 (6th ed. 2008) (col-
lecting authorities); Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the
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courts scholarship that questioned the purposive interpretation of
statutes and the Constitution-interpretations that advanced what the
interpreter saw as their overriding aims and principles. 26 In the fields
of legislation, law and economics, 27 and administrative law,28 a wave of
scholarship emphasized text, as well as the compromises and compet-
ing values reflected in statutes and the Constitution. Such views sug-
gested that statutes should not be read as unidirectionally aimed
toward forwarding one particular goal without regard to the limita-
tions in the statutes, and that the over- and underenforcement of law
could be of similar importance. 29
Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REv. 335, 339-44 (2002) (finding that Long had no
significant impact on state courts' reliance on state constitutional law).
26 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Criti-
cal Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS, at civ (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (noting
that the Warren Court's statutory interpretation was a liberal version of legal process
philosophy, emphasizing interpretation of statutes and the Constitution consistent
with their purposes and constitutional principles, but deemphasizing the legal process
concern with the limited competence of courts); id. at cxxiii (discussing rise of views
contrary to purposivism and noting that law and economic scholars were doubtful of
an approach that seeks to serve overall statutory purposes); see also generally FALLON ET
AL., supra note 23, at 623-26 (discussing different statutory interpretation styles).
27 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 538-40
(1983) (emphasizing that only the statutory text is what Congress enacted by legiti-
mate processes for legislation, and the text reflects legislative compromises); Richard
A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI.
L. REV. 263, 266 (1982) (discussing an interest group theory of legislation that is "pes-
simistic concerning the purpose and effects of legislation, while [a] public interest
theory is optimistic," and noting that the public interest theory flourished when peo-
ple favored an expansion of government and the interest group theory arose with
"disillusionment with big government that began in the 1970's"); id. at 264 (finding
the theories nevertheless compatible).
28 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, "Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J.
1129, 1170 (1983) (discussing that limiting implied rights of action avoids courts'
"interfering with legislative-administrative lawmaking and enforcement discretion,"
and with the difficult task of optimizing public enforcement); Richard B. Stewart,
Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 947 (1985) (approving signs of the federal
courts' drawing back from implying individual rights of action from conditions of
federal grants, due to interference with state and local self-determination).
29 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 24, at 633 (indicating that the limitations on statutes
are an important part of their purposes); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Private Enforcement of Law, 4J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15, 31-32 (1975) (discussing problems
of overenforcement of criminal statutes if private prosecution were allowed, including
that private enforcers would not rein in penal law's tendency to overbreadth); Rich-
ard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HAR%,. L. REX.
1193, 1290-93 (1982) (discussing problems with implying private fights of action,
including disrupting legislative judgments as to appropriate enforcement levels and
undermining congressional decisions to entrust regulation to agencies, although still
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This Article examines the history of direct review of state court
judgments with a view to casting further light on the issue of the scope
of review under Section 25 and its 1867 successor. It employs Wesley
Hohfeld's categories of legal relations30 to show the gradual develop-
ment from more one-sided review of underenforcement claims to
more symmetrical review over time that included overenforcement.3 1
This trend was partly attributable to the malleability of the review stat-
utes' language.3 2 It was also due to the Court's seeing general law
protections of liberty and property as increasingly federal, 33 and to
the Court's seeing both sides of federal issues as intended benefi-
ciaries of federal law. Overall, the Article presents a middle ground
between Amar's expansive view on the one hand and Meltzer's restric-
tive view on the other. On the one hand, this history lends support to
Amar's view that the statute governing Supreme Court review of state
court judgments could often support symmetrical review. 34 On the
finding such implication sometimes appropriate). See generally FALLON ET AL., supra
note 23, at 709-10 (discussing arguments against implying rights of action from stat-
utes, including that statutes represent compromises and that implied rights risk
overdeterrence).
30 See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-59 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld I]
(outlining and explaining categories of legal relations); see also generally Wesley New-
comb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE
L.J. 710 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld II] (same).
31 Hohfeld primarily provides more accurate categories for description, and his
categories do not dictate any particular interpretation of Section 25. Hohfeld, moreo-
ver, was not concerned with whether the legal relations he discussed were sourced in
state or federal law. By offering interchangeable ways to discuss the same legal rela-
tions, however, Hohfeld may implicitly lend support to Amar's view that in "virtually
every case in which one party argues for a federal 'right,' the other side can argue that
it has a federal 'immunity'-which is simply another way of saying that one's oppo-
nent has no federal right." See Amar, Two-Tiered, supra note 2, at 1530; infra text
accompanying notes 44-54.
32 See Amar, Two-Tiered, supra note 2, at 1530; see also Ratner, supra note 2, at
185-86 (arguing that the proper scope of the review provisions logically would have
supported review of state legislation that the state courts held unconstitutional, but
that such review was not required as part of the Court's essential functions).
33 In this respect, the Article takes up suggestions by Harnett and Meltzer that
Amar paid insufficient attention to the sources of rights that the party was trying to
vindicate. See Hartnett, supra note 18, at 920-21, 920 n.77 (arguing that in the rail-
road liability cases, "federal law has so occupied the field that any claim or defense is
federal," but that in some examples, "when one party relies on federal law, the other
is relying on state law"); Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1588 n.66 (arguing that the federal
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1607, 1635 (2006), gives rights to borrowers and
against lenders, and asking if a European bank lost on such a claim, "what provision
of federal law would be the source of the bank's right or immunity?").
34 See Amar, Two-Tiered, supra note 2, at 1530.
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other hand, in accordance with Meltzer's views, the Court saw itself as
bound by congressional limitations, and its decisions expanding
review may have had more to do with expansions of what the court
saw as federal legal positions and less to do with suggestions that all
federal question jurisdiction had to vest in the federal courts. 35
The history also casts light on the view that Supreme Court review
of state courts judgments in particular, and federal court jurisdiction
in general, exist for the overriding purpose of individual rights vindi-
cation. Such views continue to infuse critiques of the Court's taking
jurisdiction to review state court overvindications of federal rights in
cases such as Long.3 6 While protection of individuals was and remains
an important aim of direct review, the Court's early applications of
Section 25 serve as a reminder that protection of federal power could
be at least as important as the protection of individual immunities
opposed to such power.37 The increasing symmetry of review reflects
the Court's understanding that enforcing not only federal power but
the limits of such power, and not only federal rights but the limits of
such rights, are important to the federal courts' role.
I. SECTION 25 AND ITS SUCCESSOR
Section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act provided:
That a finaljudgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of
law or equity38 of a State in which a decision in the suit could be
had,
[1] where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of,
or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision
is against their validity;
35 See Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1591 (noting the absence of suggestions in cases
denying review that there was a constitutional difficulty).
36 See supra note 23.
37 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489, 503 (1954) ("So completely did Congress conceive of the Court as an
agency only for vindicating federal authority, rather than for the coordination even of
federal law, that it limited the Court's jurisdiction strictly to cases in which the state
courts had denied claims of federal right."); Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of
Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1259 & n.8 (2009) (arguing generally
that judicial review in the form of narrowing interpretations of federal law was more
prevalent than is generally thought, and also stating, "The Supreme Court has often
used the power of judicial review to advance rather than to obstruct the political
projects of [federal] political leaders," and citing authorities); cf. Baker, supra note
25, at 858 ("The position of the individual as the focal point of judicial concern did
not emerge in this country until after the Second World War.").
38 The 1867 version of the Act deleted "of law or equity." See Act of Feb. 5, 1867,
ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385, 386.
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[2] or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an
authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being
repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
and the decision is in favour of such their validity,
[3] or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of
the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held
under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right,
privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party,
under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute or
commission,
39
may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court
of the United States upon a writ of error .... 40
The 1867 revisions, which the Court interpreted as making no signifi-
cant changes with respect to the question of symmetrical review at
issue herein,4 1 are provided in the footnotes.42
II. HOHFELD'S CATEGORIES
As noted above, Amar argued that a state court's overenforce-
ment of federal rights could be turned into a reviewable claim of fed-
eral immunity, while Meltzer argued that this reversal was not always
possible. 4 3 Wesley Hohfeld's categories may help to analyze the inter-
pretation of Section 25 and its 1867 successor. Although Hohfeld's
famous articles appeared in 1913 and 1917-toward the close of the
period under study here-Hohfeld aimed to describe existing legal
categories and thus his categories may help to clarify earlier practices.
This is not to suggest that the Court itself employed Hohfeld's catego-
ries, but rather that his analytical categories provide a way accurately
to describe what the Court in fact did.
Hohfeld believed legal relations could not be reduced merely to
rights and duties. 44 Rights and duties were, however, one important
pair of correlative legal relations. 45 For example, if A had a valid right
39 The 1867 revision to Clause 3 provided: "[O]r where any title, right, privilege,
or immunity is claimed under the constitution, or any treaty or statute of or commis-
sion held, or authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against
the title, right, privilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed by either party under
such constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or authority .... " Id.
40 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 83, 85-86 (paragraph breaks added).
41 See Trebilcock v. Wilson, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 687, 694 (1871) (indicating that
the revisions were not significant).
42 See supra notes 38-39.
43 See supra notes 9-10, 17-23 and accompanying text.
44 See Hohfeld I, supra note 30, at 28.
45 Id. at 33.
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to a piece of property, then B would have a duty to stay off A's prop-
erty. But one could also express their opposites. If A had no right in
the property, then B had a privilege vis-A-vis A to enter the property-
that is, B had no duty to A to refrain from entering the property.
4 6
Another set ofjural relations starts with the correlatives of power
and liability. Hohfeld defined a power as a party's legal ability to
effect changes in legal relations as against another person.47 The cor-
relative was the liability of another party to have the latter's legal rela-
tions changed by the person with power.48 For example, an agent has
power to bind his principal by entering a contract, and the principal is
liable to having his legal relations changed by the agent.49 Hohfeld
stated that the powers of public officers (for example, of a sheriff to
sell property under a writ of execution) were similar to those of
agents. 50
But if Yis not liable to have his legal relations changed by X, then
Yhas an immunity.5 1 An immunity makes one not liable to the power
of another to change one's legal relations. Thus although a sheriff
may have a power to sell property at a sheriffs sale (and thereby
change the legal relations of the owner), the owner could have an
immunity with respect to some parcel, such that he is not liable (to
the sheriffs power to change legal relations) with respect to that
parcel. 52
Hohfeld summarized:
A right is one's affirmative claim against another, and a privilege is
one's freedom from the right or claim of another. Similarly, a
power is one's affirmative "control" over a given legal relation as
against another; whereas an immunity is one's freedom from the
legal power or "control" of another as regards some legal relation. 53
46 Id. at 37. A privilege was the negation of a specific duty. B could still have
duties to a third party who owned the property. See id. at 36.
47 Id. at 44-45.
48 Id. at 45.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 47.
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Hohfeld's charts of correlative and opposites are reproduced in the
footnote. 54
III. COORDINATING SECTION 25 AND HOHFELD
Neither Section 25 nor the Court used terminology in the same
precise way as Hohfeld. In addition, the Court's rulings on motions to
dismiss writs of error were often brief and revealed little of the Court's
reasoning. This Article nevertheless translates the Court's applica-
tions of Section 25 and its successor into Hohfeldian terminology to
describe which positions as to federal law got review and to trace
changes over time in the Court's applications of the review provisions.
To avoid the multiplication of terminology, this Article principally
uses the Hohfeldian categories of right/privilege and power/immu-
nity to refer to the opposing positions of parties.55 Statutory terms will
generally be in quotation marks, while Hohfeldian categories will be
in regular type; e.g., "title, right, privilege or exemption" refer to Sec-
tion 25's language, while right, privilege, power, and immunity refer
to Hohfeldian terms.
In most of the cases this Article will discuss, the party seeking
review will be arguing a proposition of federal law, which the review
provisions generally required. Section 25's Clauses 1 and 2 involved
the validity of federal and state law vis-t-vis supreme federal law,5 6 and
Clause 3 required that there be "drawn in question the construction
of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or com-
mission held under the United States."'5 7 Additional language in Sec-
tion 25 provided that "no other error shall be assigned or regarded as
a ground of reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such as ...
immediately respects the before mentioned questions of validity or
54 See id. at 30:
Jural rights privilege power immunity
Opposites no-rights duty disability liability
Jural right privilege power immunity
Correlatives duty no-right liability disability
55 One could use other Hohfeldian terms to describe essentially the same posi-
tions, without changing the analysis. For example, one could say that a defendant
arguing against a plaintiffs right is arguing that the plaintiff has no right vis-A-vis the
defendant-which is generally the same as arguing that the defendant has a privilege
vis-A-vis the plaintiff.
56 See supra Part I.
57 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86. The 1867 Act did not use
the "construction" language. See supra note 39.
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construction of the said constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions,
or authorities in dispute."5' 8
That a party was arguing a proposition of federal law, however,
did not mean that he got review under Section 25. Rather, Clause 159
and Clause 260 clearly indicated that only certain positions with
respect to federal law got review under those clauses. While Clause
361 was more ambiguous, the early Court did not interpret Clause 3 to
allow review merely because the would-be appellant 62 argued that that
state court had decided a controlling issue of federal law incorrectly.
Thus, it was not every loser on an issue of federal law that the Court
saw as stating a sufficiently federal "title, right, privilege or exemption"
to obtain review under Section 25. (By using the term federal, this
Article does not exclude interests taking their origins in nonfederal
law that are nevertheless federally protected.63)
In translating the Court's application of the review provisions to
Hohfeldian terminology, then, this Article adds possible characteriza-
tions of positions as federal or nonfederal-characterizations that
were not a concern of Hohfeld. For example, the Article may refer to
a nonfederal immunity. A characterization of a Hohfeldian position
as nonfederal does not indicate that no federal law was at issue on
appeal (for federal law generally was at issue), but rather that the
Court did not see the would-be appellant as seeking to vindicate a
sufficiently federal position to obtain review. In statutory terms, the
58 § 25, 1 Stat. at 86-87. This qualification was eliminated in the 1867 version,
although the Court determined the amendments still required its review to be limited
to matters respecting the federal question. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 590, 626-33 (1874). A nonfederal issue might need to be decided to deter-
mine the federal issue.
59 Clause 1 provided for review "where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty
or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is
against their validity." § 25, 1 Stat. at 85.
60 Clause 2 provided for review "where is drawn in question the validity of a stat-
ute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repug-
nant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in
favour of such their validity." Id.
61 Clause 3 provided for review "where is drawn in question the construction of
any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under
the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption
specially set up or claimed by either party, under such clause of the said Constitution,
treaty, statute or commission." Id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85-86.
62 This Article will sometimes use the words "appeal" and "appellant" in place of
the more correct terms "writ of error" and "plaintiff in error."
63 For example, a title might be federally protected even if the federal govern-
ment did not grant the title. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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party was not stating a sufficiently federal "title, right, privilege or
exemption" under Clause 3.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE STATUTES: STATE
POWERS/FEDERAL IMMUNITIES
The paradigm case for Section 25 review was one in which the
plaintiff in error (appellant) brought a federal constitutional chal-
lenge to a state statute-a statute that the state courts upheld. For
example, in Gibbons v. Ogden,64 Ogden sought to enforce a New
York-granted steamboat monopoly against Gibbons, who operated
two steamboats under federal coasting trade licenses.65 Gibbons
claimed the state-granted monopoly was repugnant to the federal
licensing legislation. 66 When Gibbons lost on his claim of federal
immunity to the state power, his appeal fell squarely within Section
25's language providing for mandatory review in Clause 2: "where is
drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised
under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the consti-
tution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in
favour of such their validity." 67 Numerous other cases fit this model of
review at the instance of the party who claimed a federal immunity to
state power, and who had lost in the state courts.
68
By contrast, the party seeking to vindicate state power and who
lost in the state court could not seek review-in accord with Professors
Meltzer's and Hartnett's views of the one-sided nature of Supreme
Court review. In Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky v. Griffith,69 for exam-
64 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
65 See id. at 2 (statement of the case); see also Whittington, supra note 37, at 1296
(noting that the Court was sometimes called upon to uphold the validity of federal
power as part of its inquiry into conflicting state action, as was true in Gibbons).
66 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 2-3 (statement of the case).
67 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85; see Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
at 186 (noting that the appellant contended that the laws giving the exclusive privi-
leges were repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States). Review also
might have fit under Clauses 1 and 3.
68 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425, 436-37 (1819)
(reversing the state court's holding that the federal law creating the bank was uncon-
stitutional, and also holding that the bank could not be taxed by the state); Sinnot v.
Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 238-39, 244 (1859) (invalidating, at the instance
of a steamboat operator, a fine exacted by Mobile pilotage commissioners as conflict-
ing with federal laws); Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577
(1886) (invalidating, on direct review at the railroad's instance, state rate regulation
to the extent it covered interstate commerce, even though Congress had not yet
regulated).
69 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 56 (1840).
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ple, a debtor sought to avoid paying a promissory note he gave to the
state-owned and incorporated bank by arguing that the bank notes he
received in exchange for the promissory note violated the federal con-
stitutional prohibition on state-issued bills of credit.70 A Missouri
court upheld the debtor's constitutional defense against the Kentucky
bank, and the bank sought review. 71 The state bank's attorney argued
to the U.S. Supreme Court that the bank notes did not violate the bill-
of-credit prohibition, and that the bank was entitled to review because
the reserved powers of the states were constitutional rights under the
Tenth Amendment:
The state of Kentucky, in the exercise of its reserved rights, had
established the Bank of the Commonwealth. She claims under this
authority, and relies on the clause of the Constitution which
declares all powers not granted by the Constitution to be reserved.
She says that by the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri she
is interrupted in the exercise of her reserved rights. She claims to
have these rights guarantied to her, and their exercise protected by
this Court.
7 2
There were two possible ways one might view the parties' posi-
tions in this case, using Hohfeldian terms and adding characteriza-
tions of the position as state or federal. One might be:
state power/federal immunity.73
That is, the bank argued that the state had validly conferred upon the
bank power to change legal relations by issuing the bank notes; the
debtor argued that the Constitution's bill-of-credit prohibition dis-
empowered the state from authorizing the bank to issue those notes,
thereby giving the debtor a federal immunity from the change in legal
70 Id. at 57; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall . . . emit Bills of
Credit . . ").
71 See Griffith, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 57.
72 Id. at 57 (argument of counsel). In a prior case on direct review, Briscoe v.
Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837), a Kentucky court sustained the bank's
authority. Id. at 311. The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the case at the debtor's
instance, but rejected his constitutional challenge. Id. at 327. The statute establish-
ing the bank provided "[t] hat a bank shall be, and the same is hereby established, in
the name and on behalf of the Commonwealth of Kentucky," and that "[t]he whole
capital of said bank shall be exclusively the property of the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky, and no individual or corporation shall be permitted to own, or pay for any part
of the capital of said bank." See id. at 302. There does not appear to have been a
standing problem in the bank's arguing for the state's "rights" in Griffith. See Griffith,
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 57 (argument of counsel).
73 In such set-off pairings, the position that poses difficulties for review is in ital-
ics. The position in regular type, had it been rejected by the state court, could easily
obtain review under Section 25.
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relations that the use of the bank notes purported to effect.7 4 This
characterization would suggest that the bank should not get review,
because it only sought to vindicate the state power position. Clause 2
of Section 25, moreover, indicated review should only be available
when a state court upheld state authority in the teeth of a federal law
challenge ("or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of,
or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their
being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity").75 And as
was generally the case for those facing Section 25 difficulties, the
plaintiff in error (here, the bank) was ultimately arguing for federal
law to have no effect on it.7 6
On the other hand, a power can be protected by the Constitution
even if not sourced in it, just as can a right, privilege, or immunity.77
Indeed, a large concern of the Framers of the Constitution and the
1789 Judiciary Act was protection of British landowners and creditors
from state confiscations. The treaties with Britain protected but did
not create the British subjects' land and contract rights, and clearly
Section 25 encompassed review for their federally protected rights.
78
Similarly, there is nothing incorrect in saying that the Tenth Amend-
ment protects the powers that it reserves to the states, even if those
powers do not take their origins in the federal Constitution.
79
Thus one could plausibly characterize the parties' positions in
Griffith as:
federally protected state power/federal immunity
That is, the state's power was not within the restriction of the Constitu-
tion's bill-of-credit prohibition, and thereby was protected by the
Tenth Amendment. And although Clause 2 would not accord review,
74 Griffith, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 56-57 (argument of counsel).
75 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85.
76 Thanks to John Harrison for this insight.
77 See, e.g., Mayor of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 224, 234 (1835)
(rejecting an argument that a case can arise under the Constitution or a treaty only
when the right is created by the Constitution or by a treaty).
78 See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 356-57 (1816).
Analogously the Due Process Clauses protect property rights that generally are not
federally sourced.
79 Compare Amar, Two-Tiered, supra note 2, at 1531 (arguing that an overbroad
interpretation of a constitutional restriction on state power can be seen as a "denial of
the state's tenth amendment rights, rights arising under federal law"), with Hartnett,
supra note 18, at 921 n.79 ("Amar's view of the Tenth Amendment as a source of
nationally protected states' rights against the people of the state [is] implausible."),
and Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1588 n.66 (suggesting that the Tenth Amendment is
more plausibly read as a truism than a source of rights).
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Section 25's Clause 3 might arguably accommodate such a reserved
power claim ("or where is drawn in question the construction of any
clause of the constitution . . . and the decision is against the title,
right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either
party, under such clause of the said Constitution").80 The Bank of
Kentucky could argue that it had an "exemption"81 due to its notes'
being outside of the bill-of-credit prohibition, and that it therefore
had an "exemption" protected by the Tenth Amendment.
The Court implicitly opted for the state power/federal immunity
view, and unanimously denied review, apparently seeing Section 25's
text as disallowing its jurisdiction. Chief Justice Taney relied on
Clause 2 of Section 25,82 and he may well have thought that the poten-
tially broader Clause 3 should not be read to undo Clause 2's restric-
tions that specifically addressed the constitutionality of state statutes.
The Court may thus have seen Clause 2 as occupying the field of its
review of the validity of a state statutes, although the Court did not
explicitly articulate this interpretation. Add to this that Chief Justice
Marshall had already given a one-sided reading even to Clause 3 in
holding that a party who complained that a state court had improp-
erly granted the defendant removal under a federal statute could not
obtain review, reasoning that the state court decision "was not against
the privilege claimed under the statute." 83 Indeed, the Marshall and
Taney Courts fairly consistently interpreted Section 25 in such a way
that it did not give review to the party arguing that, at the end of the
day, federal law should leave him alone. 84 That both the Marshall and
Taney courts opted for the narrower view when a potentially broader
interpretation was arguably available suggests that mandatory vesting
did not loom as a concern for most Justices of the early Court.8 5
80 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85.
81 As above, this Article uses quotation marks to refer to statutory categories, not
Hohfeld's categories. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
82 Commonwealth Bank of Ky. v. Griffith, 39 U.S. (15 Pet.) 56, 57-58 (1840).
83 Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 268, 270 (1806) (emphasis omitted).
84 But cf. Montgomery v. Hernandez, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 129, 134 (1827)
(allowing a losing defendant on a federal statutory claim for recovery on a bond to
raise a federal statute-of-limitations defense on review from a state court judgment).
In addition, a party with federal title or a federally protected title could not always get
review, when his primary argument was directed to defeating the other party's federal
title. See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
85 The Taney Court gave broad interpretations to federal court jurisdiction on a
number of occasions. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 262, 277 (1985) (concluding that
the Taney Court presided over "a striking expansion of federal judicial authority
beyond the boundaries set by the Marshall Court"); Charles Evans Hughes, Roger
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The narrow interpretation implicitly required the Court to deter-
mine what would and would not count as a sufficiently federal "title,
right, privilege or exemption" to obtain review. Treating the state
power at issue in Griffith as federally protected state power would likely
have seemed odd for the Court because such a characterization might
have implied that the states owed their reserved powers to federal con-
cession. Prevailing notions of federalism saw state and federal power
as independently derived from the sovereign people. The Taney
Court, moreover, espoused notions of dual sovereignty whereby the
state and federal governments were supreme in their respective
spheres, with the Court helping to police the boundaries between
those spheres.8 6 While review in Griffith would have assisted the
Court's policing of the state/federal boundaries, still the notion that
state power was state power would seem the more natural view under
dual sovereignty and other views of federalism.
Dual sovereignty notions, moreover, did not seek merely to pro-
tect the proper state sphere, but the federal sphere as well-as the
Taney Court was well aware when it fended off attacks upon the fed-
eral fugitive slave laws in cases such as Prigg v. Pennsylvania.8 7 And in
Griffith it was the federal sphere-federal power, not state power-
that Taney saw Section 25 as protecting:
The power given to the Supreme Court by this act of Congress was
intended to protect the general government in the free and unin-
terrupted exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Constitu-
tion, and to prevent any serious impediment from being thrown in
its way while acting within the sphere of its legitimate authority.
The right was therefore given to this Court to re-examine the judg-
ments of the state Courts, where the relative powers of the general
and state government had been in controversy, and the decision
had been in favour of the latter.8 8
Brooke Taney, 17 A.B.A.J. 785, 787 (1931) (noting that Taney's jurisdictional decisions
could be even more national than Marshall's). The narrow interpretation of Section
25, however, often had the effect of promoting federal power.
86 See Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite
Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 39, 45-46; Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism,
36 VA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1950).
87 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 617-18 (1842) (upholding the federal law and indicating
that states were largely precluded from providing additional regulation); see also
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1859) (rebuffing a challenge to the
Fugitive Slave Act in holding that state courts could not issue habeas to federal
officers).
88 Commonwealth Bank of Ky. v. Griffith, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 56, 58 (1840) (discuss-
ing Clause 2); see also Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1590 (discussing Griffith as giving a
possible explanation for Section 25's drafting in that "Congress might have feared
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V. FEDERAL POWER/OPPOSING IMMUNITIES
As Chief Justice Taney's reasoning in refusing to give review in
Griffith highlights, protecting federal power against state encroach-
ments was a large concern in Section 25. And indeed, the Court's
practice under Section 25 sometimes allowed concerns for federal
power to trump concerns for individual immunities.
A. Trespass Actions Against Federal Officers
In the early Republic, citizens frequently sued federal officers on
common law claims in state courts. In a typical case, a plaintiff
brought a trespass-type claim against a federal customs officer who
had seized his goods or his vessel, the officer claimed legal justifica-
tion, and the plaintiff replied that such justification was wanting. Par-
ticularly before the 1833 statute allowing customs officers to remove
cases against them to federal court, the Supreme Court had occasion
to review many such common law actions that had been decided in
the state courts and rendered a number of decisions favorable to the
plaintiffs. 8 9 One might, then, easily assume that a citizen who lost in
state court on an argument that a federal official acted in excess of his
authority would often have been the party to obtain review.90
Closer examination of these cases, however, indicates it was the
officer and not the citizen who generally sought and obtained review
in such cases.9 1 The officer who lost on his defense of federal power
that state courts would underprotect rather than overprotect federal rights"); cf
Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States-
A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1913) (dis-
cussing hostility to Supreme Court review of state court judgments, which hindered
legislative proposals to expand the statute).
89 See, e.g., Sands v. Knox, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 499, 503 (1806) (affirming on writ of
error to New York state court ajudgment against the customs collector for detaining a
schooner); Otis v. Bacon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 589, 596 (1813) (affirming on direct
review a judgment for the plaintiff in a trover action); cf. Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 284, 289 (1851) (upholding on direct review a plaintiff's trover claim against a
postmaster for withholding mail absent statutory justification and noting, "As the
Court of Appeals could not have adjudicated the case without having denied to the
defendant a defence which he claimed under a law of the United States, the case is
properly here under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789").
90 See Engdahl, supra note 11, at 531 (referring to tort actions against both state
and federal officials in state courts and stating "but if the state court ruled against the
plaintiffs claimed federal right, of course that federal question could be taken to the
Supreme Court under section 25").
91 See, e.g., Sands, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 499 (indicating Knox had sued Sands, the
collector, for trespass for seizure of cargo and vessel); Otis, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 593
(indicating that Bacon was the original plaintiff and the state court had rejected the
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in state court obtained review under Clause 1 of Section 25 ("where is
drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority
exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their
validity") .92 The citizens who argued that the officer overstepped his
powers, and that federal power had been overenforced against the
plaintiff, were not the plaintiffs in error as to these trespass claims,
although one might plausibly believe them candidates for review
under Clause 3 ("where is drawn in question the construction of any
clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission
held under the United States, and the decision is against the title,
right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either
party, under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute or
commission") .93
Again using Hohfeldian categories, one way to characterize the
parties' positions would be:
officer's claim of justification). This Article's assessment that review was at the
instance of the officers derives primarily from checking cases collected in Ann Wool-
handler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. Rav. 396
(1987). Particularly see id. at 412-37, 441-47, 453-58 and accompanying notes. This
technique is admittedly not conclusive.
If, however, the plaintiff took the option of suing not on the common law action
but under a federal statute that required marshals to maintain bonds and that allowed
suits on the bonds, the plaintiff presumably could have received review. Cf M'Clung
v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 599, 604 (1821) (reviewing at the instance of the
citizen a claim for mandamus against the register of the federal land office, although
ultimately holding that the state court lacked jurisdiction); Montgomery v. Her-
nandez, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 129, 132 (1827) (indicating that the defendant surety on
the bond was not the proper party to seek review for most issues of statutory liability
on the bond); McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1891) (holding that
although the statute allowing suits against federal receivers without leave of court gave
the plaintiff rather than the defendant receiver rights, still the receiver could obtain
review because the decision was adverse to the authority exercised under the United
States).
92 See Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 340 (1865) (stating that "[t]here
seems to be no reason to doubt that the case comes within the provisions of the 25th
section of the Judiciary Act," because the defendant had claimed the protection of
.,an authority exercised under the United States'" and the decision was against that
protection (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 83, 85)).
93 After the 1833 Removal Act allowed customs officers to remove actions against
them, see Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat. 632, 633-34, federal marshals were
the primary targets of generally unremovable citizen suits in state courts. Supreme
Court review of common law actions against marshals still seemed to be primarily at
the officers' instance. See, e.g., Buck, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 335 (indicating that Colbath
sued Buck, who was the federal marshal); Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 U.S. 266 (1891)
(reviewing an action at the instance of the defendant deputy marshal); see also Appel-
lant's Abstract of Record at R.1, Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 U.S. 266 (1891) (No. 486)
(indicating that the original plaintiffs alleged conversion).
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federal power/federal immunity.
That is, the officer was arguing that federal law gave him power to
effect a change in possession or ownership by the seizure; he there-
fore could easily obtain review if he lost. The citizen argued that the
officer lacked such power to effect a valid change of possession or
ownership, and the lack of federal power could be seen as giving rise
to a corresponding federally sourced or federally protected immunity
to be free from the seizure when federal power was lacking. (As noted
above, "federal" as used in characterizing a party's position encom-
passes both federally sourced and federally protected positions.
94 )
But the absence of review at the instance of citizens in the early fed-
eral officer cases suggests that contemporaries implicitly saw the posi-
tions as involving:
federal power/ nonfederal immunity.
This latter characterization was likely traceable to a view that the citi-
zen was overall vindicating common law or state law protections (to
property and to be free from trespass thereto) in his trespass action.
That the officer was alleged to have acted beyond his federal power,
while definitely involving an argument about the scope of that federal
power, still was not seen as primarily vindicating a federal immunity. 95
One might think that the Fourth Amendment would provide a
source of an explicit federal immunity in at least some of the seizure
cases; modem cases (such as Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics9 6 recognizing affirmative claims for relief
under the Fourth Amendment) suggest that the citizen would have
had a sufficiently federal "title, right, privilege or exemption" to qual-
ify for Section 25 review.9 7 And even in the absence of Bivens actions,
94 See supra text accompanying note 63.
95 One might arguably characterize the positions of the parties as involving state
right (as against trespass) and federal privilege (giving the plaintiff no right as against
a duly empowered federal officer). Hohfeld, however, used the power/immunity
characterization in describing an officer's seizure of property. See supra text accompa-
nying note 50.
Note that the Court's viewing the immunity as nonfederal does not suggest that
the Court's disallowing review is consistent with Amar's mandatory vesting theory.
Rather, his mandatory vesting theory takes the view that Article III requires that either
an original or appellate federal forum must be available for "all Cases . . . arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties." See U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2. Cases arising under federal law have in turn been defined as those involv-
ing federal law issues. See Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note 2, at 211 n.17, 229, 246.
96 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
97 See id. at 389 (recognizing a federal cause of action against federal officers for
damages for violation of the Fourth Amendment); id. at 390 (noting the govern-
ment's argument that the rights asserted by the plaintiffs were primarily state rights of
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the Fourth Amendment arguably might have been raised to negate
the federal officer's claim of legal justification and form the basis for
review. But the early nineteenth-century cases rarely mentioned the
Fourth Amendment.98 This failure may manifest a view that some of
the Bill of Rights merely confirmed preexisting common law rights
and did not create them.99 Indeed, the Federalists had argued that a
bill of rights was unnecessary, because the Constitution's limited enu-
meration of powers meant the general government already lacked
powers to authorize, e.g., unreasonable searches and seizures.100
Thus it was to common law protections rather than the Fourth
Amendment that litigants looked to vindicate their search and seizure
claims.
Nor is it clear that an explicit invocation of the Fourth Amend-
ment would have mattered. Even where a citizen alleged a specific
constitutional immunity to federal power, the Court was at least ini-
tially reluctant to grant review. In Reddall v. Bryan,101 for example, the
plaintiff sued various federal officers for trespass after his land had
been subjected to eminent domain. As described by Chief Justice
Taney, the plaintiff alleged that the condemnation had been "repug-
nant to the Constitution" because it was "for no public purpose ...
connected with the United States."'1 2 The plaintiff also alleged that
privacy); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 169 (1961) (recognizing a damages
claim under the 1871 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), for Fourth Amend-
ment violations by officers acting under color of state law); cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 681 (1946) (noting that the complaint should not be dismissed for want of fed-
eral question jurisdiction when, even if the complaint stated a common law damages
action in trespass, it was clear that the petitioners nonfrivolously sought recovery for
violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647,
652 (1963) (stating that damages against federal officials for abuse of power are usu-
ally governed by local law).
98 See Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 605-11 (1993)
(discussing that in the antebellum period, constitutional issues were associated with
statutory validity, and that ad hoc violations by federal officials were rarely raised as
constitutional issues as opposed to common law issues).
99 See Michael G. Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions, and the
Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1503 & n.60 (1989) (indicating that the Court
did not see property rights as rights "secured by" the Constitution for purposes of
what is now § 1983, because such rights "were defined and created by the common
law; they pre-dated the Constitution and thus took their origin outside of it").
100 See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing, and as they retain every-
thing, they have no need of particular reservations ... .
101 65 U.S. (24 How.) 420 (1860).
102 Id. at 421-22 (noting that the bill alleged that no such purchase was author-
ized by Congress, that the pretended sanction of Maryland legislation and the federal
executive were repugnant to the Constitution, and that the land was not intended for
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the Congress had not authorized the condemnation. His petition for
writ of error explicitly invoked the Fifth Amendment, as well as the
Tenth.10 3 While the Court found the state court's decree nonfinal, it
also noted that there was no ground for Section 25 review even were
the decree final. Taney stated, "We do not see in the plaintiffs bill
any right claimed under the laws of the United States. On the con-
trary, the claim is against the rights asserted by the United States, and
exercised by the agents of the Government under its authority ....
As appeared to be the case in the customs officer cases that we
might now treat as raising Fourth Amendment claims, the Court
seems to have seen the plaintiffs property interests as to which he
invoked Fifth Amendment protection as essentially nonfederal. 10 5 As
mentioned above, it was possible to grant review for federally pro-
tected interests that were not federally created, 0 6 but the Court did
not do so in this case. The Court in Reddall treated neither the more
specific argument that the condemnation violated the public purpose
requirement nor the more general argument that the executive acted
outside of congressional authorization as covered by Section 25.
a public purpose of Maryland or of the United States in its federal character); see also
Sager, Foreword, supra note 15, at 59 n.121 (concluding that although "Reddall hints
that the case involved a fifth amendment challenge," the Court "did not take it into
account").
103 See Petition of William C. Reddall at R. 12, Reddall, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 420 (No.
247). The original Bill of Complaint alleged that the condemnation, which had been
authorized by a state statute, was "for no public purpose of the State of Maryland, nor
for a purpose connected with the United States of America as such, and of a federal
and general character, nor even so declared to be in said act of [the Maryland]
Assembly, or in any action of Congress of the United States." Bill of Complaint at R.
7, Reddall, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 420 (No. 247); cf Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444, 476-79
(1859) (addressing both state and federal law arguments).
104 Reddall, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 422-23. Taney's reference to the absence of a
"right claimed under the laws of the United States" seems to advert to language in
Clause 3, although the reference to federal "authority" seems to refer to Clause 1. See
id.
105 Cf. Michael G. Collins, October Term, 1896-Embracing Due Process, 45 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 71, 91 (2001) (noting that when the Court readjust compensation and
public purposes limitations into the Fourteenth Amendment, "[w]hat was 'incorpo-
rated' ... was not some provision of the Bill of Right's Fifth Amendment, but the pre-
existing limitation on governmental action that the Fifth already happened explicitly
to incorporate against federal action," and citing authority (footnote omitted)). But
cf. Baron v. Mayor of Bait., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247, 251 (1833) (holding that there
was no Section 25 jurisdiction when the losing plaintiff below claimed that the city
violated his Fifth Amendment rights because the Fifth Amendment did not restrain
the legislative power of the states).
106 See supra text accompanying note 63.
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Even in cases that the early Court reviewed at the officer's
instance, the Court teased out state law issues it would not review,
manifesting its view that federal power provided a discrete affirmative
defense to otherwise operative state or general law. In Gelston v.
Hoyt,1 07 for example, the Court reviewed and affirmed a damages
judgment against federal officers for seizing a ship.108 The Court
reviewed the exclusion of evidence offered by the defendants to prove
the right of seizure-evidence that would support their defense of
valid federal authority.10 9 Justice Story, however, indicated that the
Court's review did not encompass the officers' allegation that the
plaintiffs proof of his original cause was insufficient. 10 And although
the Court effectively rejected the defendants' argument that their act-
ing in an official capacity should reduce compensatory damages,'
Story opined that the rule of damages was in any event one of the
common law not reviewable by the Court. 12
The Court's treating certain federally protected interests in prop-
erty as insufficiently federal for purposes of direct review was also evi-
107 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818).
108 See id. at 305.
109 See id. at 309. The Court, however, held that the evidence was properly
excluded, because the vessel had been acquitted in a prior libel action in which the
federal court had denied to the officers a certificate of probable cause-thereby con-
clusively establishing the seizure as tortious. See id. at 314, 320.
110 See id. at 309. The Court at first said, "no error has been shown," and then
indicated that if there were error it could not be reexamined, in that the determina-
tion of sufficiency "does not draw in question any authority exercised under the
United States, nor the construction of any statute of the United States." Id.
111 See id. at 325 (indicating that it was not error to exclude the evidence of official
capacity that the defendants wanted introduced in justification or mitigation, given
that official capacity legally did not diminish the actual damages that were sought).
112 See id. at 325-26 ("It is a question depending altogether upon the common
law; and the act of congress has expressly precluded us from a consideration of such a
question. Whether such a restriction can be defended upon public policy, or princi-
ple, may well admit of most serious doubts."). Despite Gelston's language, the Court
reviewed many common law issues in federal officer cases. See, e.g., Etheridge v.
Sperry, 139 U.S. 266, 267 (1891) (reviewing the issue of whether the plaintiff had a
prior chattel mortgage on the seized property in affirming on the merits ajudgment
against a deputy marshal); see also McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 331 (1891)
(referring to Etheridge as allowing review of common law defenses in allowing review at
the instance of a federal receiver sued in state court). The Court necessarily devel-
oped what we might call a federal common law of legaljustification. See, e.g., Buck v.
Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 343-44 (1865) (indicating that when a marshal seized
property that belonged to someone other than the judgment debtor, he was liable if
acting under a writ directing him to seize property of the judgment debtor but not if
he acted under a writ describing the particular property that he seized).
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dent in cases involving federally protected land titles.' 1 3 Treaties and
statutes protected property interests previously acquired under for-
eign governments, and the United States itself granted land patents to
such prior claimants as well as to new claimants of unoccupied land
that Congress had opened to sale or preemption.' 1 4 For the Court,
the mere fact that federal or federally protected titles were involved
was not enough to support jurisdiction under Section 25 or its succes-
sor.1 15 Sometimes the Court avoided jurisdiction by saying that only
the party making the argument to uphold the federal title at issue
could obtain review of a state court decision against him.1 16 But even
when the party seeking review was the proponent of the federal title at
issue, the Court might treat his argument as not sufficiently involving
a construction of federal law to obtain review.
The Court apparently saw many federal protections of title as
merely confirming preexisting rights that were nonfederal in
nature. 1 7 While the Court's review in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee 1 8 had
113 The land cases generally involve federal rights and corresponding privileges
rather than federal powers and corresponding immunities. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 191-95.
114 The Court addressed many state and local issues in land claims in diversity
cases. See 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE WITH GERALD GUNTHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MAR-
SHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 763-64 (2010) (indicating that a
number of state land grant cases came to the Court via diversity and that overall the
Court did not develop general law property rules).
115 See, e.g., Mayor of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 224, 236 (1835)
(indicating that to grant review would involve taking jurisdiction of all controversies
respecting titles originating before the cession).
116 See, e.g., Ryan v. Thomas, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 603, 604 (1866) (dismissing appeal,
where the plaintiff in error claimed that the state court should not have recognized
the other party's federal patent because it was originally issued to a fake name); De
Lamar's Nev. Gold Mining Co. v. Nesbitt, 177 U.S. 523, 528 (1900) (holding that
because the plaintiff in error who had the junior claim was arguing to negative the
senior claimant's title, he could not get review).
117 See, e.g., De Armas, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 236 (denying review where the city
claimed that it had title from a French grant that was treaty protected, noting that the
issue turned on the "legal rights of the parties under the crowns of France and
Spain"); Phillips v. Mound City Land & Water Ass'n, 124 U.S. 605, 609, 612 (1888)
(finding that where both parties claimed under Mexican grants confirmed by the
United States and although treaties protected land titles to Mexican grantees, there
was no federal issue for review when the question was one of whether a partition
occurred while the land was under the Mexican government); De Lamar's, 177 U.S. at
527 (noting on direct review that conflicting mining claims under the federal statue
were not alone enough to give jurisdiction "since no dispute arose as to the legality of
such location, except so far as it covered ground previously located, or as to the con-
struction of this section [of the federal statute]"). For a discussion of cases where the
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encompassed nonfederal issues bearing on whether the plaintiff in
error's preexisting British title was federal treaty protected, the Court
did not see the issues in many land cases as so closely bearing on a
construction of federal law.119 For example, in Kennedy's Executors v.
Lessee of Hunt,120 although the plaintiff in error claimed under a fed-
eral statute specifically confirming certain incomplete Spanish conces-
sions, the Court denied review because the issue between the parties
was one of alluvion that was not a matter of federal law.' 21 As the
Court said in another case in denying review of a title that the plaintiff
in error claimed was protected by the treaty with Mexico, "Article VIII
of the treaty protected all existing property rights within the limits of
the ceded territory, but it neither created the rights nor defined them.
Their existence was not made to depend on the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States."1 22
The lack of review at the instance of citizens in their trespass-type
cases against officers, and the Court's explicit denial that jurisdiction
Supreme Court held there was a lack of federal question jurisdiction in the lower
federal courts based on similar reasoning, see generally James H. Chadbourn & A.
Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 657 (1942).
118 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
119 See id. at 312-13 (reviewing the nonfederal issue of whether the land had
escheated under state law, to determine if the confiscation was forbidden by the
treaty); see also Crowell v. Randell, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 368, 393-94 (1836) (discussing
cases where the treaty issue of confiscation was presented on the face of the record
and was reviewable).
120 48 U.S. (7 How.) 586 (1849).
121 See id. at 593-94 (indicating that the federal statute's confirmation was only
conclusive as between the patentee and the United States, and the alluvion issue
between the parties was not a matter of federal law); id. at 594 (indicating that the
issue between the parties would have similarly been unreviewable even if the rival
claimant's senior title originated in the United States).
122 Cal. Powder Works v. Davis, 151 U.S. 389, 395 (1894) (quoting Phillips, 124
U.S. at 610) (quoting such language to deny that a federal question existed for review
where both parties claimed under Mexican grants that were protected by treaty and
that had been confirmed by procedures under an 1851 statute, and where the plain-
tiff in error sought review from a quiet title action in which his claim of a senior
Mexican grant had been held fraudulent); cf Iowa v. Rood, 187 U.S. 87 (1902) (dis-
missing review for lack of a federal question when the state alleged that it had title to
riverbeds pursuant, inter alia, to the statute admitting it to the Union on the same
basis as other states, and stating, "The real question then is whether the sovereignty of
the State over the beds of its inland lakes rests upon some statute or provision of the
Constitution, or upon general principles of the common law which long antedated
the Constitution, and had their origin in rights conceded to the Crown centuries
before the severance of our relations with the mother country").
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would exist in the eminent domain case Reddall, indicate that contem-
poraries did not necessarily see Section 25 as encompassing review in
the ordinary case of a citizen arguing for an immunity from federal
power. This contrasted with the easily available review for parties
arguing a federal immunity from state power, as in cases such as Gib-
bons.123 This lack of review in turn suggests that the Court often saw
the citizen's preexisting freedom from unauthorized federal
encroachments as insufficiently federal to qualify for review. This lack
of review, moreover, encompassed not merely cases in which citizens
alleged that officers acted beyond federal law authorization, but also
those in which the plaintiff alleged a specific protection such as the
Fifth Amendment.124
The Court may have seen some explicit constitutional protections
such as the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as merely protecting and
restating preexisting common law interests in life, liberty, and prop-
erty, and thus as essentially similar to claims to be free from unautho-
rized federal power simpliciter. While the Court explicitly indicated
that its review could extend to both federally protected preexisting
common law interests as well as federally created interests, the former
were perhaps somewhat easier selectively to exclude from review as
insufficiently federal. Modern parallels may be found in property
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but whose random
impairment by state and local government officials will not always give
rise to a due process violation, nor a concomitant federal question. As
Professor Fallon has pointed out, the Due Process Clauses often only
require the government to maintain appropriate systems for protect-
ing traditional property, rather than turning every allegedly unfair
governmental encroachment into a constitutional violation. 125
B. Constitutionality of Federal Statutes
In suits against federal officers, as discussed above, the parties
and the Court seemed to assume that the party arguing for federal
power got review, while the party arguing for an immunity from that
power generally did not. An example of the same phenomenon
occurred when the constitutionality of a federal statute arose in suits
123 See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
124 SeeReddall v. Bryan, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 420, 421-22 (1860); see also Roosevelt v.
Meyer, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 512 (1863); infra text accompanying notes 127-31 (discuss-
ing Roosevelt).
125 See Richard H. Fallon,Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 311 (1993) (discussing Fourteenth
Amendment cases).
POWERS, RIGHTS, AND SECTION 25
between private parties in state court. Clause 1 of Section 25 ("where
is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an author-
ity exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their
validity") readily gave review when a state court invalidated a federal
statute. The difficult issue was whether a party who claimed that con-
gressional power was lacking was asserting a sufficiently federal immu-
nity under Clause 3.
The positions of the parties in cases involving the validity of fed-
eral statutes could be seen as involving
federal power/federal immunity.126
That is, one party argued for federal power to change legal relations
by enacting and implementing the statute, and if he lost in state court
he easily got review. The other side argued that the federal statute
could not change legal relations because it violated federal constitu-
tional limitations, thereby conferring a federal immunity to the claim
of federal power. Alternatively, one might characterize the positions
for review as
federal power/ nonfederal immunity.
The party arguing the want of federal power to enact the statute could
be seen as seeking to vindicate the state of affairs that would exist
without federal law (i.e., a nonfederal immunity).
The Court apparently took the latter view in Roosevelt v. Meyer,1 27
toward the end of Taney's ChiefJusticeship. Roosevelt challenged an
1862 federal statute making U.S. notes legal tender in payment of
debts, in that the statute reduced the value of repayment. 128 The state
court upheld the federal statute, and Roosevelt sought review arguing
that the federal act exceeded enumerated powers. In addition,
Roosevelt claimed "particularly under Article 5 of the amendments" a
violation of "a right of property, sacred under the fundamental law of
the Union" that could not be taken away "without due process of good
constitutional law." 129 The Court, however, granted the motion to dis-
miss the writ of error, noting that the federal statute had been upheld
by the state court. 130 As was perhaps the case in Reddall, the Court
126 Again, these are Hohfeldian positions, with the addition of federal and
nonfederal characterizations. The position that easily garnered review if the state
court rejected that position is in regular type, and the difficult position is in italics.
127 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 512.
128 See id. at 516 (argument of counsel). The parties stipulated to the difference
in value. See id. at 514 (statement of the case).
129 Id. at 516 (argument of counsel).
130 See id. at 517; see also Ratner, supra note 2, at 185 ("[The Court] failed to recog-
nize that a state court decision upholding the constitutionality of a federal statute
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may have seen the Fifth Amendment claim, as well as the lack-of-enu-
merated-powers argument, as essentially seeking to maintain a preex-
isting nonfederal status quo. In addition, the Court may have thought
that Section 25's Clause 3 should not be read as an end-run around
the limitations of Clause 1, which provided review only where the state
court decision was against the validity of federal authority.13 1
Subsequent to Roosevelt, the Court gave more liberal interpreta-
tions to the review provisions. The Chase Court overruled Roosevelt in
Trebilcock v. Wilson,132 a case challenging on various constitutional and
statutory grounds the same 1862 legal tender act at issue in Roosevelt,
and in which the state court had, as in Roosevelt, upheld the federal
law. In Trebilcock, Justice Field noted that the Roosevelt court
"appear[ed] to have overlooked" Clause 3 of the review statute, which
according to Field would have sustained review of the constitutional
claims alleged in Roosevelt.133 He reasoned:
The plaintiff in error in that case claimed the right to have the bond
of the defendant paid in gold or silver coin under the Constitution,
upon a proper construction of that clause which authorizes Con-
gress to coin money and regulate the value thereof and of foreign
coin; and of those articles of the amendments which protect a per-
son from deprivation of his property without due process of law;
and declare that the enumeration of certain rights in the Constitu-
tion shall not be construed as a denial or disparagement of others
retained by the people; and reserve to the States or the people the
powers not delegated to the United States or prohibited to the
States.1 34
necessarily denies to the party attacking the statute an asserted right under the Consti-
tution to have ajudgment in his favor or an asserted immunity under the Constitution
from having judgment entered against him on the basis of the statute . . ").
131 Seeing Clause 1 as occupying the field of review for the validity of federal
authority faces the problem that Clause 3 explicitly refers to decisions against the
"title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party, under
such clause of the said Constitution." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 83, 85
(emphasis added). Constitutional claims generally encompass claims that govern-
mental action is invalid.
132 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 687 (1871).
133 Id. at 692-93; see also P. PHILLIPS & W. HALLETr PHILLIPS, THE STATUTORYJURIS-
DICTION AND PRACrICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 192-93 (New
York, Banks & Bros. 5th ed. 1887) (noting the contrasting decisions in Roosevelt and
Trebilcock). Field added that Trebilcock also had argued that he had been denied
rights under federal statutes making gold and silver coin legal tender per their nomi-
nal and declared values. Trebilcock, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 693. While these cases came
up after the 1867 amendments to the review statute, the Court indicated that the
amendments made no difference to the result. Id. at 694.
134 See id. at 693.
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The Court had earlier reached a similar result without addressing
reviewability in one of the more famous Legal Tender Cases135
proper. 136
Given that the plaintiff in error in Roosevelt relied on Clause 3 in
his brief arguing against the motion to dismiss the writ of error,1 37 one
doubts that-as Field suggested in Trebilcock-the Court had in fact
"overlooked" Clause 3. Perhaps the Court, as noted above, merely
took the position that the more restrictive Clause 1 covered the case.
But the narrower review of the past may also have reflected a sense
that many constitutionally protected preexisting interests were still
somewhat nonfederal.
Field, by contrast, tended to enhance the federal constitutional
status of common law interests in property and liberty that existed
where legitimate government power ran out. For Field, when govern-
ment acted beyond public purposes, or took property without just
compensation, it invaded the liberty and property that government
existed to protect.138 A majority of the Court often agreed, but they
were as yet only willing to impose such limitations on the states as a
matter of general common law in diversity cases such as Loan Ass'n v.
Topeka.'39 Field, however, would have moved such general common
135 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
136 See id. at 461-62 (describing facts in Parker v. Davis in which the Massachusetts
court had ordered Parker to execute a deed upon payment by Davis of the amount
under the contract in notes of the United States, as opposed to coin which Parker
demanded; that is, the state court had upheld the federal act). The U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the federal act in the Legal Tender Cases, see id. at 553, but in Trebilcock
read the statute as inapplicable to contracts providing specifically for payment in spe-
cie, see Trebilcock, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 697.
137 Points of Plaintiff in Error on Motion to Dismiss at 1, 4, Roosevelt v. Meyer, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 512 (1863) (No. 315).
138 See generally Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-
Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM.
HIsT. 970 (1975) (discussing Field's jurisprudence).
139 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 666 (1874) (striking down state taxation to subsidize a
manufacturing plant, in that such subsidization did not serve a public purpose, but
rather merely transferred funds from A to B). Compare Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 180-81 (1871) (upholding in a diversity action a claim for just
compensation for flooding of plaintiffs property), with Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247, 251 (1833) (holding that there was no Section 25 review of a
claim for compensation for flooding of the plaintiff's property because the Fifth
Amendment was inapplicable to the states). See generally Michael G. Collins, Before
Lochner-Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL.
L. REv. 1263, 1291-93 (2000) (indicating that substantive due process norms had
developed not only in the state courts but in federal courts as well, as general constitu-
tional law in diversity cases); Collins, supra note 105 (discussing the Court's transform-
ing general law norms into Fourteenth Amendment constraints). Collins suggests
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law limitations under the Fourteenth Amendment umbrella. 140 In his
dissent in the Granger Cases, for example, he argued that unremunera-
tive state-set railroad rates diminished the value of the railroad's prop-
erty; such rates effectively took property for public use without
compensation, and this taking violated the Due Process Clause.1 41 For
Field in Roosevelt, then, the claim of reduction in the value of repay-
ment from the federal legal tender act would clearly have involved a
federal immunity to federal power, and not merely a protection of
common law interests.
Despite Field's broader interpretation of the review provisions,
the Court wavered in allowing the party challenging a federal statute
to obtain review. 142 Dicta in a later decision seemed to see the issue as
still open, 143 and the Court in 1902 dismissed an appeal in an appar-
ently insignificant legal tender case where the state court had upheld
the federal statute. 1 44
that an impetus for grounding limitations on government in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment may have been some Justices' increasing reluctance to rely on general constitu-
tional law as a source of limitations, a related trend toward use of the 1875 federal
question statute rather than diversity for actions to vindicate limits on state action,
and nascent positivism. See id. at 76, 93-94; id. at 93-94 nn.109-16 (citing
authorities).
140 For example, Field argued in his Slaughter-House dissent that the state lacked a
sufficient public purpose in granting the butchering monopoly at issue; the state
thereby encroached upon common law rights to engage in the common occupations,
and violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 87-89, 101-02, 106 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting), discussed in McCurdy,
supra note 138, at 976-78.
141 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 144 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting); Stone v.
Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181, 184-85 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting); see also McCurdy, supra
note 138, at 999-1001 (discussing Field's views in the Granger Cases that constitutional
protections for property extended beyond title and possession).
142 See Sager, Foreword, supra note 15, at 59-60 (discussing conflicting cases as to
the reviewability of state court decisions upholding federal statutes and concluding
"[t]hese brief, scattered, and inconsistent decisions" did not necessarily negate a
claim that the federal courts need to be available to control federal officials).
143 See Missouri v. Andriano, 138 U.S. 496, 499 (1891) ("[T]here is some force in
the argument that the right of review in cases involving the construction of a federal
statute should be mutual . . ").
144 Baker v. Baldwin, 187 U.S. 61, 62-63 (1902) (noting that the Michigan court
said the sole question was whether the act "making the silver dollar of 412.5 grams
troy of standard silver a full legal tender" was constitutional, and the state court held
it was (quoting Baldwin v. Baker, 80 N.W. 259, 260 (Mich. 1899))); id. ("That decision
is assigned for error but it was not a decision against the validity of the statute .... As
our jurisdiction over the judgments and decrees of state courts in suits in which the
validity of statutes of the United States is drawn in question can only be exercised...
when the decision is against their validity, the writ of error cannot be maintained.").
The constitutional objections were that the act exceeded congressional power to coin
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In a pair of decisions not long thereafter, however, the Court
reached a similar result as had Field in Trebilcock, and rejected
motions to dismiss in cases where the state courts upheld the validity
of federal laws against constitutional challenges. In Illinois Central
Railroad v. McKendree,145 the railroad challenged a federal statute
restricting the transportation of diseased cattle as entailing an uncon-
stitutional delegation of power to the Secretary of Agriculture. In
addition, the railroad argued that the Secretary's regulations
addressed intrastate commerce, thereby exceeding both constitu-
tional and statutory authority, and also that the statute did not author-
ize a damages action. 146 The Court upheld its jurisdiction. In doing
so, the Court did not require any explicit federal immunity such as a
Fifth Amendment claim; the allegation of insufficient federal power
equaled a federal immunity that now got review. 147 The Court
reached a similar result in St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway
v. Taylor,148 with respect to a nondelegation challenge to the Federal
Safety Appliance Act.149 This Article will discuss McKendree and Taylor
again below, when addressing review of statutory issues.
I50
By the time of McKendree and Taylor, two developments would
have made review for the party seeking to invalidate the statute seem
unexceptionable. First, as discussed more fully below, the Court had
and regulate the value of money and were "in conflict with the provision of the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Brief for Plaintiff in
Error at 2, Baker, 187 U.S. 61 (No. 17,526).
145 203 U.S. 514 (1902).
146 Id. at 526 ("The railroad company, by the proceedings and judgment in this
case, was denied the alleged Federal rights and immunities specially set up in the
proceedings, in the enforcement of a statute and departmental orders averred to be
beyond the constitutional power of Congress and the authority of the Secretary of
Agriculture, and in the rendition of a judgment for damages in an action under the
statute and order, in opposition to the insistence of the defendant that, even if consti-
tutional, the statute did not confer such power or authorize a judgment for dam-
ages."). The Court did not decide the railroad's nondelegation claim, but held that
the regulation exceeded the Secretary's statutory power in that it regulated intrastate
commerce that was beyond Congress's power. See id. at 527.
147 Id. at 525-27.
148 210 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1908) (indicating that a federal question for review was
presented by the railroad's claim that there was an unconstitutional delegation,
although rejecting it).
149 Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531.
150 The Court in Taylor seemed to address the issue as whether the argument
against the act's constitutionality raised a federal issue, Taylor, 210 U.S. at 285, but
that question encompassed what the party's position was on the federal issue. Id. at
293; see also Brief and Argument for Defendant in Error at 8, Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (No.
201) (arguing that the plaintiff had not been denied a federal right).
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moved in the direction of allowing symmetrical review in a number of
cases involving the application of federal statutes. Second, a majority
of the Court had moved toward Justice Field's views, thereby giving
enhanced constitutional status to common law interests in liberty and
property. In cases such as Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chi-
cago151 the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed just
compensation and public purpose requirements on the states. 152
What had once been general common law immunities that the Court
might enforce in diversity cases were now federal immunities. As such,
they gave a basis for direct review when denied in the state courts, 153
and they increasingly gave the basis for original federal court jurisdic-
tion in cases such as Ex parte Young.154
The Court's giving a more federal-positive-law spin to citizens'
common law immunities when state power was at issue would tend to
suggest that the Court would make a similar move when citizens'
immunities against federal power were at issue as well. 155 Indeed, it
would have been anomalous to treat public purpose limitations on
state governments as positive federal constitutional immunities while
not treating the often more textually supported limitations on the fed-
eral government as less than fully federal. Accordingly, the Court saw
arguments that the federal statutes and regulations at issue in McKen-
151 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
152 See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 177-78 (1896)
(indicating that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed a public purpose limitation on
state taxation, although holding that an irrigation project served a public purpose);
Chi., Burlington, 166 U.S. at 241 (holding that ajust compensation principle was appli-
cable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Smyth v. Ames, 169
U.S. 466, 526, 546-47 (1898) (holding that state-set rates that did not provide a fair
return on the current value of the railroad effectively took property for public use
without compensation, and therefore violated Fourteenth Amendment due process).
153 See, e.g., Chi., Burlington, 166 U.S. at 228 (reviewing the state court's decision).
154 209 U.S. 123, 143-45 (1908) (holding that federal question jurisdiction existed
where the railroad had sought to enjoin enforcement of a state law providing large
penalties for charging in excess of state-prescribed rates that the railroad alleged were
confiscatory).
155 See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908) (holding that it was not
within congressional power to make it a criminal offense for a carrier in interstate
commerce to discharge an employee for union membership, and that such statute
invaded Fifth Amendment liberty and property and was therefore beyond the com-
merce power); cf. Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 111
(1902) (allowing an injunctive action against the postmaster for failing to deliver mail
without sufficient statutory authorization); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 268
(1918) (entertaining an action by parent as next friend of minor children to enjoin
enforcement of federal child labor prohibitions).
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dree and Taylor exceeded congressional powers as stating plausible
claims for genuinely federal immunities. 156
The federal power/immunity cases suggest that the asymmetrical
review of state court decisions cannot totally be attributed to an over-
riding purpose to protect individuals' interests from overreaching gov-
ernmental power. Rather, federal power was the legal position that
the Court favored over the opposing immunity position in many of its
applications of its jurisdictional provisions. Characterizing the federal
power position as involving federal rights obscures this concern. This
is not to argue against review of the immunity claims-quite the con-
trary. Rather, the federal power cases suggest, as will the later con-
gressional reaction to the Court's inability to review Ives v. South
Buffalo Railway in which the state court struck down the New York
workers' compensation law, that both power and immunity from
power are commensurable concerns for Supreme Court review.
VI. THE EXPANSION OF SYMMETRIcAL REVIEW AS TO ISSUES
UNDER FEDERAL STATUTES
As alluded to above, the early twentieth-century cases in which
the Court confirmed review for appellants arguing that federal stat-
utes were unconstitutional had support in the Court's move from
early asymmetrical review to more symmetrical review in some federal
statutory cases. The Marshall and Taney Courts' interpretations of the
interaction of Section 25 with federal statutes favored asymmetrical
review. For example, in Gordon v. Caldcleugh,157 the defendant exer-
cised the statutorily granted power to remove an action from state
court to federal court based on alienage diversity. 158 The plaintiff
argued that complete diversity was lacking and sought Supreme Court
review from the state court decision allowing removal. As mentioned
above, the Court dismissed the writ of error, with Chief Justice Mar-
shall reasoning that the decision "was not against the privilege claimed
under the statute; and, therefore, this court has no jurisdiction in the
case."'159 The Court effectively decided that the primary beneficiary of
the federal statute was the party who sought removal; Section 25's text
encouraged but did not necessarily require the Court to view statutes
156 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
157 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 268 (1806).
158 Id. at 270; cf Provident Sav. Life Assurance Soc'y v. Ford, 114 U.S. 635, 639
(1885) (reviewing on direct review the state court's denial of removal).
159 Gordon, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 270; see also supra text accompanying note 83.
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as having a purpose to benefit one side. Such one-sided review com-
ports with the Meltzer view that Section 25 did not allow for review of
all federal issues arising in the state courts.
In the interim between Justice Field's allowing review to a party
arguing for an immunity from federal power in Trebilcock and the later
confirmation of the availability of such review in McKendree and Taylor,
the Court would move toward more symmetrical review in cases under
some federal statutes. These cases thus provide support for the Amar
view, that the language of the review statutes could accommodate
both sides of many federal issues. Several factors may have made sym-
metrical review a slightly easier sell as to statutorily granted interests
than as to constitutional interests in limitations on federal power.
First, even for the party who clearly was entitled to review, the
Court treated Clause 3 as the review provision.160 This meant that the
Court may have been less inclined to see a broad interpretation of
Clause 3 as an end-run around the clearly one-sided Clauses 1 and 2,
as it perhaps had in cases involving the constitutionality of federal and
state statutes discussed above.
Second, the explicit limitations in various federal statutes may
have suggested to the Court that opposing parties could both be the
beneficiaries of statutes. Indeed, the apparently singular instance of
either the Marshall or Taney Courts' allowing review for a party who
ultimately sought merely to be left alone by federal law involved a
defendant arguing a federal statute-of-limitations bar to a federal stat-
utory action. 161 Of course it is also true that the Constitution had
explicit limitations on federal power, such as the Fifth Amendment.
But perhaps the Court saw federal statutes as more likely to crowd out
the normal common law/state law default rules, whereas the Court
160 Cf Gordon, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 270 (noting, in denying jurisdiction, that state
decision allowing removal "was not against the privilege claimed under the statute");
McCormick v. Mkt. Bank, 165 U.S. 553, 546 (1897) (indicating that the review for
either side would have been under Clause 3, by referring to "immunity" and "right").
161 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Hernandez, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 129, 132-33 (1827)
(holding that where the plaintiff had brought an action under a federal statute
allowing suits on the marshal's bond, the losing surety could not claim that he had
been denied a "title, fight, privilege, or exemption" as to most statutory issues he
raised, but could claim as to the federal statute of limitations an "exemption under
the laws of the United States, from liability as surety of the marshal"); cf Jenkins v.
Lowenthal, 110 U.S. 222, 222 (1884) (indicating that the decision upholding the fed-
eral statute-of-limitations defense against the claims of the bankruptcy assignee would
be reviewable, but finding that the state court's decision had also been based on the
state law ground that the present owners were innocent purchasers for value).
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tended to see the Constitution as more confirmatory of common law/
state law default rules. 162
This view of statutory law as displacing more of the state and com-
mon law would have been enhanced with Congress's increasingly
comprehensive railroad regulation at the turn of the century, some of
which the Court would eventually find preempted state liabilities and
remedies in the same field. 163 The increasing federal occupation of
certain areas of law arguably should have made little difference in the
application of the review statute; after all, federal law had been at
issue when the Court denied review because the party was on the
wrong side of the federal issue. And one might still have conceptual-
ized an argument for nonliability under a federal statute as seeking
primarily to vindicate the defendant's nonfederal interests in retain-
ing her property, free from the effect of federal law. Nevertheless, the
increased perception that statutes displaced common and state law
may have enhanced the tendency to see both sides of a federal issue as
advancing claims of a federal "title, right, privilege, or immunity."'
164
As the Court noted in allowing review at the instance of a defendant
railroad in a Federal Safety Appliance Act case, "In the case before us,
the liability of the defendant does not grow out of the common-law
duty of master to servant."1 65 This view contrasted with the early tres-
162 Cf Ill. Cent. R.R. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. 514, 527 (1902) (noting that the suit
for spreading disease to cattle was based on the federal statute and not on common
law principles).
163 See Hartnett, supra note 18, at 920 & n.77 (treating the railroad cases brought
under, inter alia, the Federal Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act as not supporting Amar's theory because in such cases federal law "so occupied
the field that any claim or defense [was] federal"); see also Stephen A. Gardbaum, The
Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 801-02 (1994) (discussing the Court's
decisions between 1912 and 1920 that knocked out state laws that were consistent or
supplemental to federal law); cf. Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S.
426, 441-42 (1907) (disallowing a state action where the shipper claimed a published
rate was unreasonable, in that primary jurisdiction belonged to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission under the Interstate Commerce Act, Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104,
§§ 6, 10, 24 Stat. 379, 380-83, amended by Elkins Amendment, Act of Feb. 19, 1903, ch.
708, § 3, 32 Stat. 847, 848).
164 The language is from the 1867 version of the statute, which substituted "immu-
nity" for "exemption." See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
165 St. Louis, Iron Mtn. & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 294 (1908); see also St.
Louis, Iron Mtn. & S. Ry. v. McWhirter, 229 U.S. 265, 277 (1913) (reasoning that the
action was reviewable because the controversy was of a purely federal character); cf.
St. Louis, S.F. & Tex. Ry. v. Seale, 229 U.S. 156, 157-58 (1913) (holding that under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), the proper party to bring the case was
the personal representative, and noting that the wrongful death action was not recog-
nized at common law and that compliance with the applicable statutes was required).
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pass cases against officers such as Gelston v. Hoyt, in which the Court
saw federal law as only discretely intervening into state law.166 In addi-
tion, preemption of state regulation reinforced notions that both
over- and underenforcement of federal law were significant. 167
A. Bankruptcy Discharge Cases
The initial one-sided nature of review, and the later expansion to
symmetrical review, are evident in cases in which a party claimed the
benefit of a federal bankruptcy discharge. Typically a creditor sued
on a state contract, and the defendant claimed a federal privilege (dis-
charge) to the state-created right.1 68
A party who was denied this federal privilege in state court easily
fit within the review statute's Clause 3.169 By contrast, the Court ini-
tially would not allow the creditor to obtain review if the state court
sustained the debtor's discharge defense to the state law contract
claim. In Strader v. Baldwin,'70 for example, a creditor brought an
assumpsit action for $10,000 against Baldwin, and Baldwin claimed
discharge. The creditor argued the debtor was not entitled to the dis-
charge due to a statutory exclusion if the debt had been incurred
while "acting in a fiduciary capacity."17' After the state court upheld
the discharge defense, the Taney Court rejected the creditor's
attempt to obtain review on the fiduciary capacity issue. The Court
stated that it was only the debtor who had "pleaded a privilege or
166 See supra text accompanying notes 107-12.
167 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. v. Washington, 222 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1912) (holding that
the state could not enforce an hours-of-service regulation that tracked the federal
regulation that Congress had specified would not go into effect for a year so as to
allow for adjustment to the new law).
168 Prior to the discharge, the creditor had a right to collect and the defendant a
duty to pay. The affirmative defense of discharge turned the plaintiff's state law right
into a no-right. See Hohfeld II, supra note 30, at 744 ("If, e.g., R threatens bodily
harm to X, R's right that X shall not strike him becomes thereby extinguished, and a
no-right in R substituted; or, correlatively, in such contingency, X's duty to R ceases,
and X acquires a privilege of self-defense against R.").
169 See, e.g., Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877) (reviewing denial of a bank-
ruptcy discharge).
170 50 U.S. (9 How.) 261 (1850).
171 Id. at 261 (statement of the case). The statute provided for bankruptcy for,
"[a]ll persons ... owing debts, which shall not have been created in consequence of a
defalcation as a public officer; or as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, or
while acting in any other fiduciary capacity." Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat.
440, 441.
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exemption" under the statute. 172 The Court thus implicitly saw the
legal positions of the parties as:
creditor's state contract right/debtor's federal discharge privilege.
The Court treated the creditor's opposition to the federal privilege as
trying to restore the creditor's state law contract rights, such that
there was not review. The creditor was arguing that, at the end of the
day, federal law should not affect its legal rights.
As usual, however, there was another way to view the creditor's
claim. The reliance on specific federal statutory language limiting the
discharge for debts incurred "while acting in any fiduciary charac-
ter"'173 could be seen not merely as seeking to restore the status quo
ante state contract right by arguing against the federal discharge privi-
lege, but as itself seeking a federally granted statutory benefit. In Hen-
nequin v. Clews,174 the Court effectively overruled Strader by allowing
review at the instance of the creditor who-as had the creditor in
Strader-argued that the debtor was not entitled to the discharge due
to the debt's being incurred as a fiduciary. 175 The party ultimately
arguing to be left alone by federal law thus was now able to get review.
In Hohfeldian terms, we might characterize Hennequin and later
cases as implicitly seeing the legal positions of the parties as:
(partly federally protected) state contract right/
federal discharge privilege.
The Court, in this statutory area, was thus beginning to recognize
both the creditor and debtor as statutory beneficiaries, such that over-
172 Strader, 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 262; see also Linton v. Stanton, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
423, 425 (1851) (holding under the same act that a disappointed creditor was not
entitled to review where the state supreme court upheld the discharge, and also indi-
cating that claims that the debt was covered by subsequent promises was a state law
issue).
173 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517, 533.
174 111 U.S. 676 (1884).
175 See id. at 678-79; see also McCormick v. Mkt. Bank, 165 U.S. 538, 546-47 (1897)
(describing Hennequin as overruling Strader). It is not evident that anyone raised the
reviewabilty issue in Hennequin. See Index, Hennequin, 111 U.S. 676 (No. 252). The
bankruptcy in Hennequin was under the 1867 Act which provided "[t]hat no debt
created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as a
public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary character, shall be discharged under
this act." § 33, 14 Stat. at 533; see also Palmer v. Hussey, 119 U.S. 96, 98 (1886) (rely-
ing on Hennequin in upholding review of a fraud argument at the instance of a party
opposing the bankruptcy discharge); id. at 97-99 (reviewing an argument that the
discharge was invalid for undue delay, with the Court noting that perhaps a construc-
tion of a statutory time-limitation provision may have been involved, but finding
against the creditor on the ground that the prior bankruptcy proceeding foreclosed
this argument).
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enforcement favoring one party (e.g., too broad a discharge) was
another party's underenforcement (e.g., of state contract rights that
were federally protected if the debt were incurred in a fiduciary
capacity).
B. National Bank Ultra Vires Cases
The Court's turnaround in the bankruptcy cases had been fore-
shadowed in cases involving federally granted powers to private par-
ties. The National Bank Act 76 granted and limited the powers of the
banks chartered under it. The Act did not allow national banks to
make certain loans secured by real estate. 177 When national banks
sought to enforce their security interests when debtors defaulted on
loans, the debtors or other creditors sometimes sought to void the
bank's lien by claiming that it was effectively a mortgage that
exceeded the bank's federally granted powers. The banks could easily
obtain review if a state court held they lacked power under federal law
to enforce their lien. 178 And on the merits the Court ruled in favor of
the banks' power vis-A-vis the debtors and rival creditors, 79 holding
176 Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99.
177 The National Bank Act authorized national banking associations to exercise
"all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking by
• . . loaning money on personal security." Id. § 8, 13 Stat. at 101. The Act further
provided
it shall be lawful for any such organization to purchase, hold, and convey
real estate as follows:
First. Such as shall be necessary for its immediate accommodation in the
transaction of its business.
Second. Such as shall be mortgaged to it in good faith by way of security
for debts previously contracted.
Third. Such as shall be conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts previously
contracted in the course of its dealings.
Fourth. Such as it shall purchase at sales under judgments, decrees, or
mortgages held by such association, or shall purchase to secure debts due to
said association.
Such associations shall not . . . hold the possession of any real estate
under mortgage, or hold the title and possession of any real estate pur-
chased to secure any debts due to it for a longer period than five years.
Id. § 28, 13 Stat. at 107-08.
178 See Nat'l Bank v. Matthews, 98 U.S. 621 (1878) (originating as a suit to enjoin
the sale of the property); Nat'l Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99, 103 (1880) (involving
the question of whether the bank or other mortgagees and judgment creditors were
entitled to the proceeds of the foreclosure sale).
179 See Hohfeld II, supra note 30, at 756-57 (giving examples of how defective
powers nevertheless may be recognized by the law as effective to change legal rela-
tions, such as the power of a "duly appointed agent, in certain cases, to sell chattels to
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that Congress only intended federal officials to enforce the limitations
on the banks' mortgage powers through proceedings for
dissolution. 180
The ability of those opposing the national banks to obtain review
if the state court rejected their arguments that the national banks
acted ultra vires presented the difficult question. In several contexts,
including where federal law granted powers to private parties, the
Court had ruled that the party arguing for an immunity from the fed-
erally granted power could not obtain review, and thus implicidy saw
the legal positions of the parties as:
federal power/ nonfederal immunities.
For example in Gordon v. Caldcleugh, mentioned above, the Court indi-
cated that it was only the party who had been granted the federal
power of removal to federal court, not the party who opposed
removal, who could obtain review. 181 In addition, the Court had
already held in cases reviewed at the banks' instance that the debtors
and rival lienholders could not use the ultra vires defense to void the
national banks' liens. In Swope v. Leffingwell,18 2 however, a debtor who
lost on his defense that the national bank had acted beyond its feder-
ally authorized powers sought review, and the Court denied a motion
to dismiss the appeal. 183 The Court thus allowed review for the argu-
ment for an immunity from the federal power granted to a private
an innocent purchaser, even after his factual authorization has been revoked by the
principal").
180 See Matthews, 98 U.S. at 626, 629 (holding that the ultra vires defense would not
void the transaction, and that ajudgment of ouster or dissolution was the only remedy
intended by Congress); Whitney, 103 U.S. at 103 ("Whatever objection there may be to
it as security for such advances from the prohibitory provisions of statute, the objec-
tion can only be urged by the government.").
181 See supra text accompanying notes 83, 157-59.
182 105 U.S. 3 (1881).
183 Id. (taking review at the instance of the borrower, who argued that the prohibi-
tion on mortgages should protect him from the sale of the property that secured a
promissory note). The Court merely discussed the motion to dismiss as based on the
absence of a "federal question." Id. at 3-4. The defendant in error so characterized
its argument in its motion to dismiss, but meant this characterization to encompass
his argument that the plaintiff in error "in no wise claims title under that act, nor
does the decision in favor of the bank violate any right, title or privilege secured to
him by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Brief of Defendant in Error
Accompanying Motion to Dismiss at 4, Swope, 105 U.S. 3 (No. 1143). The plaintiff in
error claimed that the contract violated the federal statute, and that he therefore
"had immunity therefrom." Brief of Plaintiff in Error on Motion to Dismiss at 2,
Swope, 105 U.S. 3 (No. 1143). Although denying the motion to dismiss the debtor's
writ of error for lack ofjurisdiction, the Court summarily determined that the debtor
lost on the merits. Swope, 105 U.S. at 4.
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party. The Court now saw the national bank cases, or at least those in
which a debtor claimed that he should be free from his debt because
of statutory exceptions to the bank's power as involving:
federal power/federal immunity.
And in later cases involving claims that a private party acted outside of
federal statutorily granted power, the Court allowed review to parties
arguing against the federal power. 184
Thus, for statutes, the Court had expanded review to allow those
arguing against an alleged overvindication of a federal privilege
(bankruptcy) or a federally granted power (of national banks to enter
mortgage contracts) to obtain review, reflecting changes from the
more unidirectional view of statutory protections in older cases. The
Court would treat the expanded review in the national bank and
bankruptcy cases as mutually supportive,18 5 and also as supporting
expanded review in statutory cases more generally.'8 6 Admittedly, the
Court episodically treated only one side of a federal statute as entitled
to review.'l 7 But the Court later summarized its more liberal review
cases as standing for the proposition that
184 See, e.g., Logan Cnty. Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 139 U.S. 67, 72-73 (1891)
(allowing review to a national bank arguing its own lack of power so as to avoid an
obligation, and indicating that the "exemption or immunity" claimed under the act of
Congress had been clearly denied by the state court); Cal. Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S.
362, 365-66 (1897) (denying a motion to dismiss the bank's writ of error where the
bank alleged it should be able to avoid liability arising from an ultra vires act of hold-
ing shares of another corporation); cf. Anderson v. Carkins, 135 U.S. 483 (1890)
(granting review and relief at the instance of a party who wished to void his contract
to convey his homestead, when the statute forbad alienation of homesteads for five
years); McCormick v. Mkt. Bank, 165 U.S. 538, 547-48 (1897) (allowing a lessor to
obtain review, inter alia, on his argument that even if the bank's lease was ultra vires,
still the lease was valid vis-A-vis the lessor, and that the state decision against the lessor
"was a decision against the right so specially set up and claimed by the plaintiff under
a statute of the United States").
185 McCormick, 165 U.S. at 546 (discussing the bankruptcy cases in a national bank
case).
186 Nutt v. Knut, 200 U.S. 12, 19 (1906) (citing, inter alia, Swope and McCormick in
reviewing a claim that the plaintiff in error should not be liable on a state law contract
that was alleged to violate a federal statutory prohibition on assignment of claims).
187 See, e.g., Missouri v. Andriano, 138 U.S. 496, 498-501 (1891) (denying review to
a party who claimed his opponent in a sheriffs race was not a citizen, which was a
requirement under state law); Jersey City & Bergen R.R. v. Morgan, 160 U.S. 288,
292-93 (1895) (denying review where the railroad had not properly set up its federal
defense that it had no duty to accept a worn silver coin, and also finding that the
federal right was more the other side's right to tender the coin); Kizer v. Texarkana &
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[a] party who insists that a judgment cannot be rendered against
him consistently with the statutes of the United States may be fairly
held, within the meaning of [the review provision], to assert a right
and immunity under such statutes, although the statutes may not
give the party himself a personal or affirmative right that could be
enforced by direct suit against his adversary.188
Indeed, the Court quoted this language in the McKendree case dis-
cussed above, where the Court allowed review at the instance of a rail-
road challenging a federal statute and regulations thereunder as to
transportation of diseased livestock.1 89 The Court used the language
to support its review of the claim that the regulations exceeded statu-
tory power, and seemed to think that this argument sufficed for its
review of the argument that constitutional power had been exceeded
as well. 190 Thus the Court's moves toward symmetrical review under
statutes reinforced the argument for symmetrical review when parties
claimed that federal statutes were unconstitutional.
C. Land and Railroad Cases
This Article has not discussed many cases involving federal rights,
using the term rights in the Hohfeldian sense. Indeed, apart from the
federal land claims, there apparently were not many claims in state
courts that involved vindication of federal rights (as distinguished
from, e.g., immunities). But from the land claims and a few other
claims directly under federal statutes, one can generalize that the
early Court often identified one party as a federal rightsholder, and
therefore entitled to review if he lost. But the Court saw the party
arguing against the federal right as seeking to vindicate nonfederal
interests in being left alone by federal law, and therefore as not enti-
tled to review.
Fort Smith Ry., 179 U.S. 199 200-01 (1900) (disallowing review where the state court
upheld the railroad's claim that a contract was void under federal law because it pro-
vided for rate discrimination). Professor Hartnett correctly notes the difficultly one
would have in trying to fit Andriano within the review statute. See Hartnett, supra note
18, at 919.
188 Nutt, 200 U.S. at 19; see also Straus & Straus v. Am. Publishers' Ass'n, 231 U.S.
222, 233-34 (1913) (allowing review where the plaintiff who sought review arguably
had a federal antitrust claim which may not have been litigable in state court, as well
as a state law claim, to which the defendant successfully raised a copyright defense;
and noting that a party who argued that a federal statute gives an immunity from a
judgment against him can obtain review).
189 See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. 514, 525-26 (1906); see also text
accompanying notes 146-47.
190 See McKendree, 203 U.S. at 525-26.
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For example in the land claims where federally granted land titles
were at issue, when the Court was willing to acknowledge a federal
question at all, 191 it frequently allowed only the party who was arguing
to uphold the federal title to obtain review (as noted above). 192 In
other words, the Court implicitly saw the positions as:
federal right [claim to title under the federal land patent]/
nonfederal privilege [argument against the patent]
What is more, even when both parties claimed under federally
granted patents, the Court might deny review based on reasoning that
only one party was arguing to uphold the relevant federal right in the
particular case. For example, in Fulton v. M'Affee, 193 a junior federal
patent-holder (who would lose absent a problem with his opponent's
earlier granted federal patent) complained that the state court had
rejected parol evidence he offered of the senior claimant's fraud in
obtaining his grant. The Court said no review was available because
the evidence was only presented to defeat the senior claimant's
title. 194 In other words, the Court treated the junior claimant as only
arguing to defeat the senior claimant's federal right, although pre-
sumably defeating the senior claimant's title was necessary to establish
the validity of the junior claimant's federal tide. The Court, however,
granted symmetrical review in some cases, particularly where the Land
Department had previously litigated preemption claims between the
parties in contested proceedings before the department.195
The increasing federal statutory regulation of railroads after the
turn of the century brought new actions, such as under the Federal
Safety Appliance Act (FSAA) 196 and the Federal Employers' Liability
191 See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
192 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
193 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 149 (1842).
194 See id. at 150-51.
195 See, e.g., Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U.S. 420 (1881) (allowing review at the instance
of the junior preemption claimant who primarily argued against the senior claimant's
preemption fights).
196 The Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA) could be the basis for liability not
only for interstate workers, but also for intrastate workers who worked on railroad
equipment in interstate commerce. See Act of Mar. 2 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531; see
also Act of Mar. 2, 1903, ch. 976, § 1, 32 Stat. 943, 943 (expanding coverage to include
all cars "used on any railroad engaged in interstate commerce"); Moore v. Chesa-
peake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1934) (describing the expansion of the
FSAA's coverage). The Court at first seemed to treat these claims as federal question
suits. See St. Louis, Iron Mtn. & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 285, 292 (1908) (indi-
cating that the case alleging violations of the FSAA was brought under the state
wrongful death law, but also indicating that the action was one "arising under... the
laws of the United States"); Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) (seeming to
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Act (FELA),197 where federal law was the basis for recovery in state
courts. These actions, in which the employee could obtain compensa-
tion for injury if he could show the employer's breach of duty,
presented fairly easy cases for identifying the plaintiff employee as the
federal rightsholder and the defendant railroad as the party arguing
against the right. Nevertheless, the Court allowed the party arguing
against the statutory rights under the FSAA (as well as against the Act's
constitutionality' 9 8 ) to obtain review in St. Louis, Iron Mountain &
Southern Railway v. Taylor.199 While the defendant relied in part on a
specific statutory argument that the instructions were incorrect as to
whether certain equipment complied with the act, the position of the
railroad was effectively to argue against the plaintiffs right.200 And in
a later case, St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway v. McWhirter,
20
'
as well as in others, the Court confirmed that the railroad could
obtain review by merely arguing that it was not negligent. 20 2 The
Court clearly saw the cases as involving:
treat the action of an intrastate worker for violation of the FSAA as a federal cause of
action on review from a federal court). But cf Moore, 291 U.S. at 217 (holding that an
intrastate worker's allegation of a violation of the FSAA did not state a claim arising
under federal law for purposes of original federal court jurisdiction); Gilvary v.
Cuyahoga Valley Ry., 292 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1934) (stating, with respect to a claim by an
intrastate worker of an FSAA violation, that " [ t] hese Acts do not create, prescribe the
measure or govern the enforcement of, the liability arising from the breach").
197 The Court invalidated the first Employer's Liability Act, Act of'June 11, 1906,
Pub. L. No. 59-219, §§ 1-5, 34 Stat. 232, 232-33, in the Employers' Liability Cases, 207
U.S. 463, 498 (1908), holding that the statute exceeded the commerce power by pro-
viding liability to employees of carriers in interstate commerce without regard to
whether the carrier and its employees were engaged in interstate commerce at the
time of the injury. In the Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912), the Court
upheld the replacement act. See Act of Apr. 22, 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65,
amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-117, 36 Stat. 291.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 148-50.
199 210 U.S. 281, 287 (1908).
200 Id. at 282-83. The Court also reviewed a claim for an instruction less tied to
specific statutory language, as to whether it would be a defense if the railroad pro-
vided shims that employees could use to keep drawbars at the heights directed by the
statute. Id. at 294-95. But cf Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Duvall, 225 U.S. 477, 488
(1912) (saying that the denial of a particular instruction did not involve a construc-
tion of the act, although more or less rejecting the argument on the merits).
201 229 U.S. 265 (1913). McWhirter claimed under the 1908 FELA and also an
earlier act limiting hours of service. See Act of Mar. 4, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-272, § 2,
34 Stat. 1415, 1416.
202 McWhirter, 229 U.S. at 277-80 (reviewing an objection to an instruction that
treated a seven minute overage of the hours of service rules as negligence per se); id.
at 281 (reviewing failure to give requested instruction as to causation); see also Chi.,
Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Wright, 239 U.S. 548, 552 (1916) (reviewing on writ of error,
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federal right [of the employee]/ federal privilege [of the railroad].
Indeed, the Court said in McWhirter "[T] he right on the one part of
the plaintiff, or the immunity on the other part of the defendant,
depended exclusively upon the statute, were, in the nature of things
both necessarily Federal-since they were from the point of view of
the statute correlative.)20 3
Meltzer treated these cases as merely late-breaking exceptions to
an otherwise consistent refusal of the Court to grant review along the
lines Amar suggested. 20 4 But these cases were continuous with devel-
oping caselaw starting with Field's decision in Trebilcock and continu-
ing in the bankruptcy and national bank cases. The Taylor Court
noted that the question as to the Court's review on the statutory issues
was "whether it was a claim of a right or immunity under a statute of
the United States. Recent decisions of this court remove all doubt
from the answer to this question."20 5 In light of these developments,
allowing the defendant to seek a writ of error in the railroad liability
cases seemed unexceptionable to most of the Justices.
20 6
True, one could say that cases such as Taylor and McWhirter
marked an advance on prior developments by so starkly allowing the
party arguing against what was clearly a federal right to obtain review,
as Justice Pitney's dissent in McWhirter argued.20 7 Many of the prior
cases involved allowing review where the plaintiff in error sought to
negative a federal power or a federal privilege rather than a federal
right. What is more, the railroads in some of the cases merely argued
inter alia, the railroad's claim that it was entitled to a directed verdict because there
had been no evidence of negligence, and stating, "In this it is contended that the
company was denied a Federal right, that is, the right to be shielded from responsibil-
ity under the act of Congress when an essential element of such responsibility is
entirely wanting"); cf Chi. & Alton R.R. v. Wagner, 239 U.S 452, 457 (1915) (allowing
review under a writ of error as to a claim by a party that the release in question was
under the common law and not within the FELA prohibition of such releases). While
the 1914 amendments added the possibility of certiorari in certain cases, the allow-
ance of a writ of error under the provisions of the 1867 Act continued until 1916. See
Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790; Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari:
Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges'Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1658-59
(2000) (indicating that FELA cases were part of the reason for the 1916 revisions and
that the revisions shifted federal court litigated FELA cases from mandatory review as
well).
203 See McWhirter, 229 U.S. at 281.
204 See Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1589 & n.67 and accompanying text.
205 Taylor, 210 U.S. at 293.
206 Id. ("Jurisdiction so clearly warranted by the Constitution and so explicitly con-
ferred by the act of Congress needs no justification.").
207 See McWhirter, 229 U.S. at 284 (Pitney, J., dissenting) ("The attitude of the
defendant was that of merely denying the validity of [the plaintiffs] claims.").
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their lack of liability due to nonnegligence instead of relying on any
explicit statutory language at least arguably running to their benefit,
which distinguished the railroad cases somewhat from those involving
the fiduciary exception to the bankruptcy discharge privilege or the
mortgage exception to national banks' powers. 208 But by the time of
Taylor, the Court in McKendree had already found no trouble in
allowing parties to obtain review who merely argued the absence of
federal statutory and constitutional powers, without pointing to spe-
cific federal protections.
Overall the Court had moved toward symmetrical review as to the
following positions in some contexts. The easier positions for review
remain in regular font, while the more difficult positions for review
remain in italics. The difficult positions are now characterized as fed-
eral positions, in accordance with how the Court had come to treat
them.
federal power/federal immunity (arguments against the validity of
federal statutes and regulations;
arguments against national banks'
mortgage powers)
federally protected state right/ (arguments against bankruptcy
federal privilege discharges)
federal right/federal privilege (arguments against rights of
railroad employees to recover for
injury under federal statutes).
The Marshall and Taney Courts, in allowing only the position in regu-
lar type to obtain review, had identified the party arguing that posi-
tion as the primary beneficiary of Section 25 and by extension of the
underlying federal law at issue. If a party were arguing that federal
law, properly interpreted, should have no effect on him, he generally
did not get review. The Court later was more likely to see both sides
of a federal issue as beneficiaries of Section 25 and the underlying
federal law.
208 The Court, however, had not in fact found that the mortgage exception was
meant to benefit the debtors or rival creditors. See supra note 180 and accompanying
text; cf. McCormick v. Mkt. Bank, 165 U.S. 538, 547-48 (1897) (reviewing the lessor's
argument that the bank's statutorily disallowed lease was nevertheless valid vis-A.-vis the
lessor).
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VII. RETURN TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTES
Despite increasingly symmetrical review beginning in the latter
part of the nineteenth century, no one seems to have thought review
was available when the New York Court of Appeals struck down the
state workers' compensation statute on federal constitutional grounds
in Ives v. South Buffalo Railway.20 9 The Ives case returns us to where we
started:
state power [to enact the statute]/federal immunity
[invalidating the statute].
As discussed above, it might be possible to characterize an attempt to
vindicate a state statute as attempting to uphold federally protected state
power, and therefore as arguing for a federal "tide, right, privilege, or
immunity" under Clause 3 of the review statute. But perhaps notions
of state power as existing independently of federal protections contin-
ued to prevail.
Those arguing to validate state labor legislation in cases such as
Ives, moreover, might have been disinclined to characterize the state's
power as a constitutionally protected "privilege or immunity" under
Clause 3. After all, they were seeking to limit, not increase, the Consti-
tution's reach, and to remove the due process umbrella for common
law interests in liberty and property that Justice Field had worked to
put in place. Those seeking to expand Supreme Court direct review
for cases like Ives thus did not argue that the Tenth Amendment pro-
tected state power. Rather, they argued that with asymmetrical review
the "rights of property" had improperly taken precedence over the
"rights of humanity."210 And the rights of humanity would be served
by allowing review for those seeking to vindicate state power.
Allowing review for the state power position thus would require
the 1914 legislation. That legislation allowed the Court to grant certi-
oriari when
although the decision in such case may have been in favor of the
validity of the treaty or statute or authority exercised under the
United States or may have been against the validity of the State stat-
ute or authority claimed to be repugnant to the Constitution, trea-
209 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
210 See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 20, at 194 n.37 (quoting Theodore
Roosevelt); see also Hartnett, supra note 18, at 952 (indicating that the need to vindi-
cate popular sovereignty and uniformity were among the themes of supporters of the
1914 revisions); Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383,
403-04 (1908) (characterizing judicial interference with legislation as standing
between the public and what the public needs and discussing workers' compensation
legislation as an illustration of the superiority of legislation to the common law).
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ties, or laws of the United States, or in favor of the title, right,
privilege, or immunity claimed under the Constitution, treaty stat-
ute, commission, or authority of the United States.
2 11
CONCLUSION
The history of Section 25 and its 1867 successor may be somewhat
more supportive of Amar's view than his critics argued. The history
shows the statutes' Clause 3 was, as Amar suggested, susceptible to
interpretations allowing for symmetrical review in many cases, and
that the Court increasingly adopted such interpretations over time.
The Court's gravitation toward review for both sides implicitly shows
that the Court saw such review as appropriate to its constitutional role.
On the other hand, in accordance with Meltzer's observations,
the Marshall and Taney Courts had no trouble respecting congres-
sional limitations, and even later Courts did not advert to constitu-
tional imperatives when they expanded review.212  Rather the
expansion seems more attributable to the Court's treating common
law interests in freedom from unauthorized governmental encroach-
ments as increasingly federal, and to the Court's recognizing both
sides of a federal issue as potentially significant beneficiaries of federal
protections. Thus while the history of Section 25 is somewhat more
favorable to Amar's position than his critics claim, still the Court's rea-
soning suggested judicial deference to congressional limitations on
jurisdiction rather than mandatory vesting.
The history of Section 25 also suggests that viewing the overriding
purpose of federal court jurisdiction as individual rights protection
may be descriptively and normatively incomplete. The direct review
cases manifest that protecting federal power was also a central con-
cern, sometimes in preference to claims of individual immunities.
The initial allowance of review only for the federal-government-power
argument, and its later expansion to include the immunity-from-fed-
eral-power argument, serves as a reminder that one party's over-
enforcement is another's underenforcement. The statutory
expansion of review in 1914 in the wake of Ives v. South Buffalo Railway
serves as a similar reminder.
211 Act of Dec. 23, 1914, Pub. L. No. 63, 38 Stat. 790.
212 Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1591 ("[N]o Justice even hinted that the prevailing
view raised any constitutional difficulty.").
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